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Winter Mason 
 
 
Implicit Social Influence 
 
 
Previous research has shown that people hold two kinds of attitudes, explicit 
attitudes, which are voluntary evaluations of things, and implicit attitudes, which 
are automatic evaluations that occur spontaneously and are difficult or impossible 
to control.  Prior work has shown that social influence, whether it is intentional 
persuasion or incidental influence, usually leads the recipient of the influence to 
change his or her attitudes to be closer to the attitudes of the source of the 
influence.  This work has focused on the effect of the explicit attitudes of the 
source of influence but ignored the possible effect of the source’s implicit 
attitudes.  Three studies examine the independent effect of the source’s implicit 
attitude on a recipient in different social influence settings  
In the first study, the implicit and explicit attitudes of a source towards a 
target were measured, and in the second two studies the implicit and explicit 
attitudes of the source were manipulated.  In the first study, the recipient watched 
the source give a persuasive message about the target, in the second study the 
source described the target directly to the recipient, and in the third study, the 
recipient watched the source interacting with the target.  
Results revealed that implicit attitudes have an influence on a recipient, but in 
unexpected ways. In the first study, the sources’ implicit attitudes led to a contrast 
effect on the recipients’ explicit attitudes.  In the second and third study the 
 vi
manipulation of the sources’ attitudes did not work as expected, and the influence 
of the sources’ implicit attitudes on the recipient was not detected.  Thus, a 
person’s implicit attitudes can influence another person’s attitudes, but they must 
be strong and possibly naturally occurring. The conditions in which implicit 
attitudes lead to influence deserve further research. 
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Implicit Social Influence 
Social influence is a powerful force in human psychology.  The knowledge, 
beliefs, attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behaviors of other people shape the way 
an individual perceives, understands, and acts on the world.  This influence can 
come in the form of direct persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996), learning 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kaplan & Miller, 1987), modeling (Bandura, Ross, & 
Ross, 1963), conformity (Asch, 1951), obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963), 
unconscious mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), peer pressure (Brown, Clasen, 
& Eicher, 1986), and on and on.  When seen from a broader perspective, social 
influence underlies the very fabric of culture.  As people learn new things, 
develop new styles or fashions, or create new ways of thinking or doing things, it 
is the force of social influence that causes these developments to eventually 
permeate a people and then serve as the starting point for future developments. 
Central to many studies of social influence and a determining factor in the spread 
or stagnation of culture itself are peoples’ attitudes towards the elements of 
culture – innovations, styles, food, etc.  As revealed by the many studies of social 
influence, typically when there is influence between two people it means that the 
attitudes of the recipient of social influence are brought closer to the attitudes of 
the source of influence. 
Roughly twenty years ago, research on attitudes demonstrated that people 
could automatically evaluate stimuli, and that this evaluation was not always the 
same as the attitude expressed in response to explicit questioning.  Since then, 
there has been a surge of interest in the distinction between implicit and explicit 
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attitudes.  As a result, evidence has accumulated showing that automatic 
evaluations and deliberative evaluations can be dissociated in how they are 
shaped, how they change, and how they guide behavior.  One implication of this 
research is that a person’s automatic evaluation and deliberative evaluation can 
influence behavior simultaneously and sometimes incongruently.  However, no 
work to date has shown whether implicit and explicit attitudes can have 
independent effects on other people.  The three studies reported in this manuscript 
seek to demonstrate that the influences of a person’s automatic and deliberative 
attitudes on another person are also dissociable. 
This introduction first introduces the historical struggle to define attitudes, 
especially the difference between implicit and explicit attitudes, reviews evidence 
supporting the dissociation of these attitudes in measurement and influence on 
behavior, reviews work on the influence of nonverbal behaviors on attitudes, and 
finally ties it all together to show the literature supports the hypothesis that 
implicit attitudes can have an independent effect on others’ attitudes. 
What Are Attitudes? 
Defining implicit attitudes and how they differ from explicit attitudes is 
regrettably not as simple as one would like.  The meaning of implicit attitudes has 
been the center of a debate amongst attitude researchers that has brought the very 
construct of ‘attitude’ under scrutiny (Gawronski, in press). Therefore, to 
elaborate on the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes, it is necessary 
to briefly review the various definitions of “attitudes” that have been used in the 
literature.   
 3
Thurstone (1928) said an attitude is, “the sum total of a man’s inclinations and 
feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and 
convictions about any specified topic.” More recently, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) 
defined an attitude as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a 
particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 
p. 1).  Revealing the influence of cognitive psychology, Fazio, Chen, McDonel, 
and Sherman (1982) defined an attitude as an association between an object and 
an evaluation.  
While there are some common elements in these definitions, there is still 
disagreement about the best way to think of attitudes, including how an attitude is 
represented in memory (Abelson & Prentice, 1989; E. R. Smith & Conrey, 2007), 
whether attitudes are necessarily bipolar (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) or 
composed of separable positive and negative components (Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntson, 1997), whether there are multiple types or bases of attitudes (Breckler, 
1984; Zanna & Rempel, 1988), and whether attitudes are enduring dispositions 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Bem, 1970; Cialdini, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1981) or 
constructed with each elicitation (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Wilson & Hodges, 
1992).  Despite these remaining ambiguities in the definition of attitudes, some of 
which were precipitated by the struggle to develop a theoretical account of 
implicit and explicit attitudes, it is possible to extract a general definition that 
seems well agreed upon: an attitude is an evaluative response to a stimulus. 
What Are Implicit Attitudes? 
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Indirect measurements of attitudes have been in use in social psychology for 
over half a century (Campbell, 1950).  For most of that time, their utility has been 
to avoid reactivity or self-presentation effects, and the assumption was that the 
indirect measurements were tapping a cleaner version of the same construct as the 
direct measurements. However, it was recognized that some evaluations were 
occurring faster than possible with deliberative thought (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986), and that the elicitation of an attitude could occur with 
the subliminal presentation of a stimulus (Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989).  
This led some researchers to hypothesize the existence of implicit attitudes 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), evaluations that could be activated automatically 
and / or outside of conscious awareness.  
This implication, that there were unconscious attitudes that could be different 
from the conscious attitudes, stirred up theoretical and empirical research on the 
topic (Fazio, in press), and is still hotly debated.  For instance, Schwarz and 
colleagues (Schwarz, in press; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001) assert that since all 
attitudes are constructed spontaneously, the empirical evidence for implicit and 
explicit attitudes is simply the result of different contextually sensitive attitude 
constructions, rather than evidence for two separate but stable attitude 
representations.  Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) suggest that implicit 
attitudes are well-learned evaluative responses to a stimulus, while explicit 
attitudes (when they differ) are recently learned responses that have not been 
practiced sufficiently to become automatic.  Fazio and colleagues (Fazio, 1990; 
Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) argue that there are two distinct processes, one 
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automatic and one controlled, that lead to differences in the attitude-behavior 
relation, and thus the differences in implicit and explicit measures.  Gawronski 
and Bodenhausen (2006) suggest that the explicit attitude is contained within a 
propositional framework (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), so the evaluation of the object 
can be compared with other beliefs and tested for veracity, whereas the implicit 
attitude is contained in an associative framework, subject to the underlying 
structure and rules of pattern activation (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; E. R. 
Smith, 1996; E. R. Smith & Conrey, 2007; E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000).  For 
instance, one could implicitly associate good feelings with fatty foods, which is 
merely an association and has no truth or falsehood to it, whereas the explicit 
attitude that “fatty foods are good,” can be checked and corrected with the 
knowledge that fatty foods lead to heart disease and obesity, which are bad. 
Nevertheless, the general agreement about how to appropriately conceptualize 
implicit attitudes is reaching consensus.  First, as already mentioned, the 
responses that are elicited with very fast presentation or in situations with little 
possibility for conscious control can be different than those given when there is 
the opportunity to reflect.  This is most strongly and reliably evident in the 
different responses to implicit and explicit attitude measures.  Second, there is 
evidence that different sources of influence affect implicit and explicit attitudes 
differentially.  Third, and finally, implicit and explicit attitudes seem to guide 
different kinds of behavior in different contexts. 
In the following three sections, this introduction reviews the history and 
development of implicit attitude measures, and especially how they differ from 
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explicit attitude measures, then describes research showing that implicit and 
explicit attitudes can be influenced by different sources, and reviews work 
showing that implicit and explicit attitudes can have different effects on behavior, 
concluding that implicit and explicit attitudes are indeed dissociable. 
Measurements of Implicit Attitudes 
In 1928, Thurstone’s manuscript, “Attitudes Can Be Measured,” marked the 
beginning of an era in attitudes research.  Thurstone developed a scale that 
respondents could use to indicate their preference, and argued that the responses 
on this scale were an adequate indicator of the person’s underlying attitude. Likert 
(1932) and Osgood et al. (1957) developed similar scales. All of these were not 
much different than opinion surveys that simply and straightforwardly asked 
participants to state their preference with respect to the attitude object.  The 
research that accompanied the creation and testing of these scales showed that 
there was a reliable correlation between the expressed attitude and the person’s 
behavior towards the attitude object.  However, this correspondence did not 
always exist (LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969), which Thurstone recognized but 
attributed to, at best, self-presentation concerns, and at worst, plain dishonesty. 
Thus, it was apparent that it was desirable to develop indirect measures of 
attitudes, to avoid the problems with self-report.  As mentioned, most of the early 
indirect measures of attitudes were designed to circumvent these self-presentation 
and honesty concerns, such as the now-famous “bogus pipeline,” (Jones & Sigall, 
1971) in which participants were persuaded to believe they were attached to what 
was essentially a lie detector to encourage fidelity in the responses.  Jones and 
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Sigall focused their method on socially sensitive issues, specifically attitudes 
towards minority groups.  However, even when responses could safely be 
assumed to be honest, they still did not always correspond with later behavior. 
Taking the lead from memory researchers who distinguished between 
automatic and controlled processes (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), Fazio et al. 
(1986) reasoned that if object-evaluation associations were stored in memory, 
their recall could also be dissociated into automatic and controlled processes.  
Indeed, they showed that priming with positive and negative words (i.e., 
cockroach or puppy) led to facilitation on the categorization of the valence of 
words that were also positive or negative.  Devine (1989) brought the effect into 
the domain of racial attitudes, and showed that unconscious priming of a 
stereotype could lead participants to utilize the stereotype in subsequent 
information processing.  Advances in technology allowed researchers to 
subliminally present pictures rather than words, and thus was born one standard 
measure of automatic attitudes, affective priming (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995).  Fazio and colleagues interpreted the facilitation in 
categorization caused by primes to be a valid and reliable measure of person’s 
attitude, although they tried to remain agnostic as to whether it was tapping a 
person’s “true” attitude by leaving a question mark at the end of the article’s title, 
“Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: 
A bona fide pipeline?” 
Nonetheless, the question sparked a veritable watershed in research on 
measures of automatic attitudes (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & 
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Howard, 1997; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, 2001; Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997).  
Most prominent is the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), 
which compares the facilitation (or inhibition) when the same response is required 
for categorizing target stimuli (e.g., African-American faces) and positively 
valenced words to the facilitation (or inhibition) when the same response is 
required for target stimuli and negative words. If the target category is strongly 
associated with positivity or negativity relative to a contrast category, there will 
be a large difference in facilitation (or inhibition) between the two response-
pairings.  Greenwald and colleagues (1998) firmly asserted that the processes 
leading to responses on the IAT were highly efficient, uncontrollable, and 
unconscious, and therefore fully automatic. 
Another measure, the Affect Misattribution Paradigm (Payne et al., 2005) uses 
the affect elicited by a stimulus in an indirect measure of attitudes.  This 
procedure relies on the affect misattribution effect in which a person is uncertain 
of the source of affect and erroneously attributes the cause to something else 
within awareness (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). In this 
procedure, exemplars from a target category (e.g. Republicans) and a foil category 
(e.g., trees) are briefly presented prior to a Chinese ideogram, and participants are 
told to ignore the prime and evaluate the ideogram.  Even if they are explicitly 
told to correct for the bias of the prime, participants under-correct and attribute 
some of the affect elicited by the prime to the ideogram.  Thus, ideograms that 
follow the target category will tend to be categorized more positively if the target 
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category elicits positive affect. Payne et al. (2005) describe their measure as an 
implicit measure, but the authors remained agnostic about the automaticity of the 
processes that led to responses on the measure. 
Bargh (1994) outlined four criteria for a process to be automatic, what he 
called the “Four Horsemen of Automaticity”: 1) increased efficiency, 2) lack of 
control, 3) lack of intention, and 4) lack of awareness.  It was clear that responses 
on explicit measures did not have any of these qualities: the responses required 
controlled, intentional deliberation within the subject’s awareness.  It was much 
less clear whether the processes that led to responses in the implicit attitude 
measures, such as facilitation in affective priming, met these four criteria.  It is 
safe to say that the responses were highly efficient, since facilitation occurs very 
rapidly. The evidence also indicated that the responses were uncontrollable and 
unintentional (Kim, 2003; Payne et al., 2005).  However, the evidence that the 
responses were unconscious was mixed, at best (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; 
Devine, 1989; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005), and was certainly not a 
requirement for the differential responses on explicit and implicit measures of 
attitudes.  Indeed, after Greenwald and Banaji (1995) postulated a separate, 
unconscious attitude, it became increasingly unclear whether the “implicit” in the 
term, “implicit attitude measure” was meant to apply to the measure (participants 
were unaware that their attitude was being measured), or to the attitude 
(participants were unaware of their attitude). 
Thus, although there is still disagreement as to whether implicit attitudes are 
necessarily unconscious – and the evidence appears to point towards the negative 
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– there are clearly times a person is unaware of their automatic attitude (Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982).  It does, however, seem safe to say that implicit attitudes 
meet the other three criteria for automaticity as defined by Bargh (1994).  As 
mentioned, this is in contrast to explicit attitudes (as measured by traditional 
“pencil and paper” questionnaires), which meet none of these criteria.  Of course, 
this does not mean that explicit and implicit attitudes cannot be the same; in fact, 
for many attitude objects they are highly correlated (see Nosek, 2007).  However, 
it does mean that they can be different, both in how they are elicited and the 
contexts in which they arise. 
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Are Influenced by Different Sources 
Not only are the attitudes dissociable in the attitude measures, there is 
evidence that the implicit and explicit attitudes can be influenced independently 
as well.  For instance, some research shows that implicit attitudes can be changed 
with no effect on explicit attitudes. Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair (2001) found 
that the mere presence of an African-American experimenter affected White 
participants’ responses on a Black-White IAT without affecting their responses on 
explicit measures such as the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & 
Batts, 1981), the Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice 
scales (Plant & Devine, 1998), or the Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).   
In another similar study, Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) showed that 
repeated exposure to admired Black persons and disliked White persons reduced 
automatic prejudice as measured by an IAT without affecting responses on feeling 
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thermometers or semantic differential scales.  Similarly, Sinclair and colleagues 
(Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005) showed that participants’ 
(negative) automatic attitudes towards Blacks was attenuated when interacting 
with an experimenter wearing a t-shirt that proclaimed anti-racism ideals.  
Presumably, participants’ affiliative goals led them to “socially tune” their 
automatic, implicit attitudes to the expressed attitudes of the experimenter. 
Using a very different methodology, Olson and Fazio (2006) showed that 
evaluative conditioning could influence participant’s implicit attitudes without 
affecting explicit attitudes.  The participants in the experimental condition saw 
photographs of Black people repeatedly paired with positively valenced words, 
while the control participants saw the same photographs and words, but the two 
were not consistently paired together.  On a subsequent measure of implicit 
attitudes, participants in the experimental condition showed a decreased 
association between Blacks and negative words compared to the control 
condition.  There was no difference between conditions on the explicit ratings of 
prejudice. 
Other research showed a change in explicit measures with no change in the 
implicit.  Gawronski and Strack (2004) showed that cognitive dissonance 
reduction changed explicit attitudes but had no effect on implicit attitudes (see 
also Schooler, 1990).  Using a standard cognitive dissonance induction procedure, 
they had participants write a counter-attitudinal essay in either a low or high 
situational pressure condition.  In the low situational pressure condition, 
attributing one’s behavior to external causes was much harder than the other, high 
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situational pressure condition.  Relative to the control condition and the high-
pressure condition, the low-pressure condition caused the explicit attitude to 
change in the direction of the essay, but did not affect the implicit attitude, 
thereby reducing the correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes. 
In work by Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006), participants learned about two 
novel groups, such that one was always described as positive and the other was 
always described as negative, which was sufficient to induce congruent explicit 
and implicit attitudes toward the novel groups.  In their third experiment, some of 
the participants were told that there was a mix-up, and the descriptors of one 
group were supposed to be applied to the other group, and then asked them to 
complete the attitude measures again.  In this study, the explicit attitude reversed 
(in accord with instructions), but the implicit attitude did not reverse, thereby 
inducing conflicting implicit and explicit attitudes in the participants.   
Most importantly, still other work showed that both attitudes could be 
simultaneously affected in opposite directions. Deutsch and Strack (2002; as 
reported in Strack & Deutsch, 2004) had participants repeatedly choose between a 
red or blue “door” that had different consequences.  One door led to a fast 
presentation of a very negative photograph, followed by a long presentation of a 
pleasant photograph.  The other door had a fast presentation of a positive 
photograph and a long presentation of a negative photograph.  When given time to 
choose between the doors, participants consistently chose the door that had the 
long presentation of a pleasant photograph.  However, when under extreme time 
pressure, the choice reversed.  Thus, the briefly presented photograph influenced 
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participants’ automatic evaluations of the doors, but the more persistent 
photograph influenced participants’ explicit attitudes. 
Using more conventional measures of implicit and explicit attitudes, Rydell, 
McConnell, Mackie, and Strain (2006) simultaneously conditioned participants 
through subliminal priming to have one implicit attitude while training them 
through a categorization procedure to have the opposite explicit attitude about a 
person.  Later measurements of the attitudes using explicit questionnaires and the 
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) revealed the participants’ implicit attitudes had been 
influenced by the primes while their explicit attitudes had been influenced by the 
categorization procedure, resulting in incongruent implicit and explicit attitudes.   
All of these examples show that explicit and implicit attitudes can be 
manipulated independently.  This implies that either the attitudes are represented 
independently or that the automatic and controlled processes that lead to 
differential evaluative responses are independent.  In either case, there appears to 
be strong evidence that not only can implicit and explicit attitudes be elicited and 
measured with different methods, but they can be changed by different means as 
well. 
Different Effects of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes on Behavior 
Most important to the research at hand, however, is whether (and how) 
implicit and explicit attitudes differentially guide behavior.  Clearly, because the 
responses on attitude measures are themselves behaviors, there are at least some 
contexts in which implicit and explicit attitudes have dissociable effects on 
behavior.  However, it is useful to delineate the contexts in which these attitudes 
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influence behavior, what behaviors are guided by automatic or controlled 
evaluations, and whether they can simultaneously influence behavior (when the 
attitudes are dissociated). 
Thirty years ago, Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein presented a summary of 
research on the attitude-behavior relationship, beginning by noting that, “Reports 
of rather low or nonsignificant relations between attitudinal predictors and 
behavioral criteria have been accumulating for more than 40 years,” (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1977, p. 1).  However, they went on to outline the conditions under 
which there was a correspondence between attitudes and behavior.  This work 
came before the implicit / explicit distinction, and indeed, the attitude measures 
they focused on would be considered explicit.  In their review, they suggested that 
the reason explicit measures sometimes failed to capture subsequent behavior was 
because the measure was aimed at a different behavior than the one being 
predicted. For instance, an explicit attitude measure might show a positive 
evaluation towards birth control, but then poorly predict future use.  However, if 
the measure instead focused on attitudes towards personally using birth control in 
high arousal situations, the favorability might drop considerably and the attitude-
behavior correlation might correspondingly increase. 
Early research on attitude-behavior consistency showed that the more a person 
engaged in reflective processing, both when considering their attitudes (Carver & 
Scheier, 1978; Snyder & Swann, 1976) and when engaging in the behavior (F. J. 
Smith, 1977; but see Wilson & Schooler, 1991), the higher the correspondence 
between the measured attitude and the behavior.  This supports the hypothesis that 
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explicit attitudes guide behavior when there is opportunity for deliberation (Fazio 
et al., 1982). 
Conversely, those behaviors that are automatic and relatively uncontrollable 
tend to be guided by implicit attitudes.  This includes speeded reactions (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004) and behaviors that are normally spontaneous, such as nonverbal 
behaviors.  Chen and Bargh (1999), replicating a study by Solarz (1960) found 
that participants were faster at pushing a lever away from themselves when 
presented with a negative stimulus and pulling it towards themselves in response 
to a positive stimulus than the opposite motor movements.  The speeded reactions 
required in the task indicate that the automatic evaluations were influencing their 
reaction times for the different behaviors. 
In a more real world example, Fazio et al. (1995) tested the predictive validity 
of the affective priming procedure, in which a Black experimenter rated the 
friendliness of her interaction with participants, paying special attention to 
nonverbal behaviors.  The experimenter’s rating was significantly correlated with 
the facilitation scores from the implicit attitude measure, but was not related to the 
participants’ scores on the MRS (McConahay et al., 1981), an explicit attitude 
measure. 
Dovidio and colleagues (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; 
Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002) also found that a priming measure 
correlated with the participants’ nonverbal friendliness towards a Black 
confederate, as measured by the confederates themselves, judges’ ratings of the 
videotaped interaction, and judges’ ratings of the participants’ nonverbal 
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behavior.  However, their verbal friendliness correlated with the explicit measure 
of racial attitudes, and with the participants’ rating of their own friendliness. 
This mimicked results from a previous study that measured nonverbal 
behaviors more carefully.  Dovidio et al. (1997) measured participants’ implicit 
racial attitudes using an affective priming procedure, and measured their explicit 
attitudes using the MRS and the Old-Fashioned Racism scale (ORS; McConahay 
et al., 1981).  They then had participants interact with a Black and White 
interviewer, which they video recorded.  They found that explicit attitudes, as 
measured by the MRS and ORS, predicted participants’ explicit ratings of the 
interviewers, such that higher scores on the explicit scales led to lower liking of 
the Black relative to the White experimenter.  The explicit scales did not, 
however, predict the participants’ nonverbal behaviors.  Instead, the lower the 
facilitation scores for Whites vs. Blacks (i.e., the more automatic prejudice 
towards Blacks), the less eye-contact and more blinking they had with the Black 
relative to the White interviewer. 
Wilson et al. (2000) reported a correlation between a priming measure of 
implicit prejudice and the number of times White participants touched a Black 
confederate’s hand when passing back and forth a pen.  Bessenoff and Sherman 
(2000) used an affective priming procedure to measure participants’ attitudes 
towards fat persons, as well as an explicit measure with three subscales (Anti-fat 
Questionnaire; Crandall, 1994).  The implicit measure predicted the distance the 
participant would place their own chair from a fat woman, which was not 
predicted by any of the subscales in the questionnaire. 
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As is evident with the differential responses on explicit and implicit measures, 
automatic and controlled evaluations guide different behaviors.  Perhaps more 
interesting, and more relevant to the research at hand, automatic evaluations can 
guide nonverbal behaviors even while deliberative evaluations are guiding more 
deliberative behavior such as verbal statements (Dovidio et al., 2002; Dovidio et 
al., 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001) or responses on explicit attitude scales. 
Summary: Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Are Dissociable 
The work reviewed here demonstrates quite thoroughly that implicit and 
explicit attitudes are dissociable.  This dissociation is not with respect to 
consciousness, as was originally believed, but with respect to automaticity and 
control.  In other words, while explicit attitudes are deliberative and therefore 
necessarily within awareness, implicit attitudes are automatic in that they are 
activated spontaneously, efficiently, and largely uncontrollably in response to a 
stimulus. However, they may or may not be outside of a person’s awareness 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003).  They are dissociated on the numerous explicit and 
implicit measures of attitudes (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Bessenoff & 
Sherman, 2000; Campbell, 1950; Fazio et al., 1995; Fazio & Olson, 2003; 
Greenwald et al., 1998; Jones & Sigall, 1971; Nosek, 2001, 2007; Payne et al., 
2005).  They can be affected or changed by different means (Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Fazio, 1990; Gregg et al., 
2006; Herr et al., 1983; Insko & Oakes, 1966; Kerpelman & Himmelfarb, 1971; 
Kim, 2003; Lowery et al., 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2006; Petty, Tormala, 
Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2000).  And they affect 
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different aspects of behavior (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Bessenoff & Sherman, 
2000; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, in press; 
Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, 1990; Fazio et al., 
1995; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & 
Leibold, 2001; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000).   
While it is possible that explicit and implicit attitudes are separate 
representations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), it is also possible that explicit 
attitudes are simply further “downstream” from implicit attitudes (i.e., occurring 
later in cognitive processing of stimuli) (Cunningham, et al., in press; Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, in press), and the different measures and manipulations merely 
affect what part of the “stream” is being tapped or changed.  Regardless, what is 
crucial to the studies at hand is that implicit and explicit attitudes can be 
independently measured and manipulated, and affect different aspects of 
behavior.  Specifically, it is relevant that explicit attitudes tend to guide 
conscious, controllable behavior, while implicit attitudes tend to guide automatic, 
spontaneous, and (often) nonverbal behavior. 
The remaining two sections of this introduction review research on the 
influence of nonverbal behaviors on other people and their attitudes, and ties this 
to the dissociation of implicit and explicit attitudes, which leads directly into the 
research reported here. 
Social Influence from Nonverbal Behavior 
The final key to the work at hand is that nonverbal behaviors can influence 
others’ attitudes and behavior.  Some of the original work on the relationship 
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between nonverbal behaviors and attitudes comes from Albert Mehrabian (1967), 
who controlled the nonverbal behaviors of an experimenter towards a participant 
and a confederate.  He found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the orientation of the 
experimenter’s head towards the participant predicted his / her rating of how 
much the experimenter liked him / her. 
Indeed, most research on the effect of nonverbal behaviors on attitudes has 
focused on increased rapport and liking.  Scheflen (1964) noted that posture 
sharing and increased rapport were correlated, and speculated that the effect could 
be bidirectional.  LaFrance (1979) used a cross-lagged panel technique to show 
that rapport at time 1 was strongly correlated with posture sharing at time 2, but 
the correlation was even stronger between posture sharing at time 1 and rapport at 
time 2, lending evidence to Scheflen’s hypothesis.  Using an experimental 
method, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) demonstrated that when a confederate 
mimicked the behavior of a target it increased liking for the confederate, and 
enhanced the “smoothness” of the interaction with the participant.   
Increased rapport is very important in some industries, especially service 
industries, and a series of studies examined the effects of nonverbal behaviors on 
customers’ behaviors.  Crusco and Wetzel (1984) showed that a light touch by a 
server significantly increased the tips received relative to customers not touched.  
Similarly Patterson (1986) showed that interpersonal touch increased compliance 
to a request for help.  Applying mimicry to tipping, van Baaren, Holland, 
Steenaert, and van Knippenberg (2003) found that servers imitating their 
customers also led to greater tips.   
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Most relevant to the current work is the role of nonverbal behaviors in social 
influence. Woodall and Burgoon (1981) found that when verbal prosody and 
nonverbal behaviors were synchronized it increased the persuasiveness of the 
speaker.  Burgoon, Birk, and Pfau (1990) hypothesized that nonverbal and 
prosodic cues can lead to the perception of credibility, which has been shown to 
increase persuasiveness (Hass, 1981; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Kelman, 
1961).  They videotaped participants giving a persuasive speech, and the 
participants’ nonverbal behaviors were coded.  Later, a second set of participants 
watched these videos, and rated the speakers on credibility and persuasiveness.  
Burgoon et al. found that immediacy of the speaker, increased eye contact, facial 
pleasantness and kinesic expressiveness were all correlated with persuasiveness.  
With respect to actual persuasion, Ridgeway (1987) had participants watch 
two confederates discuss a jury case in which a financial award had to be given to 
a victim.  One of the confederates had consistent nonverbal behaviors and speech 
across conditions, but the other confederate employed one of four nonverbal 
“styles” to accompany the same dialogue.  She found that the “High-task” style, 
which included moderate voice level, straight and relaxed posture, level 
eyebrows, frequent eye contact with normal break-offs, and a rapid speech rate, 
led participants to be influenced by the confederate: they awarded an amount 
more similar to the “High-task” confederate than to the other confederate.  Carli, 
LaFleur, and Loeber (1995) used a similar paradigm as Ridgeway (1987), and 
found that in addition to the “task” style, a “social” style – which included 
moderately high eye contact, relaxed posture, friendly facial expression, and 
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moderately calm gestures – led participants to change their opinion towards the 
confederate’s more than other nonverbal styles.  Both of these show that 
nonverbal behaviors can moderate persuasion. 
Another more recent example Bailenson and Yee (2005) used immersive 
virtual environments to control the behavior of the “confederate” to a degree that 
is impossible with real human confederates.  In this study, a participant donned 
virtual reality (VR) goggles and was immersed in an environment in which it 
appeared that another person was sitting opposite them at a table.  The person 
proceeded to deliver a persuasive message about campus security policy.  
Although participants were told the other “person” was another participant 
communicating through the VR environment, the “virtual confederate” was 
actually a computer-generated avatar that was programmed to either mimic the 
participant’s head movements with a 4 second delay, or “replay” the recorded 
movements of another participant.  Bailenson and Yee (2005) found that when the 
avatar was mimicking the participants, they were more persuaded by the avatar’s 
message than when the avatar was “replaying” the movements of another 
participant. 
Overall, these studies together show that nonverbal behavior carries 
information that is independent from verbal information, and that these behaviors 
can influence the perception of the individual as well as the persuasiveness of 
their verbal statements, and can even directly affect opinion change. 
Social Influence from Implicit Attitudes 
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It is evident from much research that implicit attitudes can guide nonverbal, 
unintentional, subtle behavior, and that this kind of behavior has subtle influential 
effects on recipients.  However, despite recent compounding evidence that 
implicit attitudes are dissociable and potentially independent from explicit 
attitudes (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Rydell et al., 2006), no research has studied the 
possibility of a person’s implicit attitude affecting others independent of her / his 
explicit attitudes. One study provided correlational evidence that a person’s 
implicit attitude can be related to another person’s attitudes or behavior. Chassin, 
Presson, Rose, Sherman, and Prost (2002) showed that a mother’s implicit 
attitudes towards smoking predicted her child’s own smoking behavior 
independent of her explicit attitude towards smoking. 
The literature just reviewed has shown that explicit and implicit attitudes can 
be dissociable, that implicit attitudes can guide nonverbal behavior, and that one’s 
nonverbal behavior can influence another’s attitudes and behavior. The research 
described here seeks to show that one’s implicit attitudes can influence another 
person’s attitudes independent of one’s explicit attitudes, and potentially outline 
the conditions under which this could occur.  Since most social influence is 
assimilative (Mason, Conrey, & Smith, 2007) – the influence causes the recipient 
to want to be more like the source – it is reasonable to expect the influence of a 
person’s implicit attitudes will also be assimilative.  Additional support for this 
hypothesis comes from studies showing that assimilation occurs with the subtle or 
subliminal presentation of a prime, even if the blatant presentation of the same 
 23
prime leads to contrast (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Strack, Schwarz, 
Bless, Kübler, & Wänke, 1993). 
However, it is not precisely clear whether to expect the effect of a person’s 
implicit attitudes to be on another person’s explicit or implicit attitudes, or both.  
It could be that the recipient of the influence would observe the source’s 
behaviors and interpret their attitude correctly, consequently using that attitude as 
information to determine their explicit attitude, either through a deliberative 
process or a more heuristic one (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).  On the other hand, the 
person might “socially tune” their attitude to the inferred attitude of the source, 
thereby causing their implicit attitude to change in the direction of the source’s 
implicit attitude (Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005).  Or there could 
be a combination of effects, such that the source’s implicit attitude has an effect 
on both the recipient’s explicit and implicit attitude.  The exact mechanism and 
pathways of influence are an open empirical question. 
To this end, I present three studies.  In Study 1, the existing attitudes of a 
source are measured, and the independent influence of his / her explicit and 
implicit attitudes are examined in a persuasive context.  In Study 2, the attitudes 
of the source toward an unknown person are independently manipulated, and then 
the source directly communicates his / her attitude towards the target to a 
recipient, and the recipient’s attitudes are subsequently measured.  In Study 3, the 
attitudes of the source are independently manipulated in a manner similar to Study 
2, however, the recipient observes the source interacting with the target rather 
than hearing the source talk about the target.  Thus, in the Study 1 the attitudes of 
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the source are measured, and in the Studies 2 and 3 the attitudes of the source are 
manipulated.  In Studies 1 and 2 the source is talking about the target, while in 
Study 3 the source is interacting with the target. 
Study 1 
The purpose of this study is to examine the independent effects of naturally 
occurring implicit and explicit attitudes on another person’s attitudes. President 
George W. Bush was chosen as the attitude object because he is likely to be 
familiar to participants and evoke strong attitudes, both implicit and explicit.  
Additionally, many of the participants in this study are likely to be students that 
come from conservative families that support the President, but the on-campus 
political atmosphere is definitively liberal, creating a norm that might contradict 
the participants’ well-learned (and therefore automatic) attitudes.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect at least some of the participants will have conflicting implicit 
and explicit attitudes towards the President.  The primary independent variables 
were the sources’ measured attitudes.  The dependent variable was the change in a 
recipient’s attitudes after observing the source deliver a persuasive message about 
the attitude object (President Bush).  
The primary hypothesis was that the nonverbal behaviors of the speaker 
would reveal his / her implicit attitudes, and either have a direct influence on the 
recipient’s attitudes independent of either the source’s explicit attitudes or the 
direction of the speech, or have a moderating effect on the attitude change caused 
by the message content.  Similar to Carli et al. (1995), the nonverbal behaviors of 
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the speaker could simply moderate the persuasiveness of the speaker, rather than 
directly influence the recipients’ attitudes towards Bush.  
Method 
This study was conducted in two phases.  Participants in the first phase had 
their attitudes measured and were then videotaped delivering a pro-Bush and an 
anti-Bush persuasive message. Participants in the second phase of the experiment 
had their attitudes measured before and after watching one of the videos from 
Phase I. 
Phase I: Participants 
Twenty-nine undergraduate students from Indiana University participated in 
the first phase of the experiment for partial course credit.  Three participants’ data 
had to be dropped because they were unable or unwilling to deliver the persuasive 
message.  Two additional participants’ data had to be dropped due to video 
recording errors, leaving 24 total participants in the first phase. 
Phase I: Procedure 
After agreeing to participate in the experiment, participants were informed 
that this was a study about communication, and that they would complete a brief 
computer-based task and answer some questions about their opinions on President 
Bush. 
All participants first completed a measure of their implicit attitudes toward 
President Bush.  To measure the participants’ implicit attitudes, we used the AMP 
(Payne et al., 2005).  To recap, in this measure participants are informed that they 
will see a series of Chinese characters that represent different concepts.  Their job 
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is to decide whether each Chinese character represents something that is good or 
something that is bad.  They are told that in addition, there will be another 
photograph that is flashed briefly before the presentation of the Chinese character, 
but that they are to ignore this picture because it is simply a warning that the 
Chinese character would appear.  Payne et al. showed that with this measure, even 
if participants are fully aware of the purpose of the priming photographs and are 
told to disregard them, participants are unable to fully correct and still tend to 
attribute some of their affect from the preceding prime to the Chinese character.   
For sixty trials, one of 6 photographs of President Bush, or one of 6 
photographs of unknown individuals matched for appearance, posture, and 
background appeared for 150 ms before being replaced by 1 of 40 randomly 
selected Chinese characters.  Participants then had as much time as they needed to 
categorize the Chinese character as “good” or “bad” by pressing either the ‘a’ or 
the ‘5’ key (see Figure 1). 
After this the participants completed a measure of their explicit attitudes 
toward President Bush.  They were shown a series of 12 statements about George 
W. Bush’s success or failure as President, and were asked to indicate their 
agreement on a traditional seven-point Likert scale (see Appendix A).  Half of the 
statements were framed positively, and half were framed negatively, and we made 
two lists of statements by reversing which questions were framed positively or 
negatively.  These two lists were counterbalanced between participants.  After 
this, they completed a “feeling thermometer” towards the President, which asks 
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them to give a number between 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm) to indicate how 
they feel about the President.  
After they completed the measures of their attitudes, they were told they 
would be videotaped reciting a speech about President Bush.  They were given a 
speech about President Bush that was either supportive or critical of his 
Presidency (see Appendix B), and told they had as much time as they needed to 
learn the contents of the speech, but that they would not be allowed to read from it 
when they delivered the message to the video camera.  Participants took from 2 - 
8 minutes to learn the speech.  After they said they were ready, the experimenter 
started the camera and gave the participants as much time as they needed to recite 
as much of the speech as they were able.  The video recording ended when the 
participant said they could not remember any more of the message (this portion 
was edited out for later use).  After this, the participants were given the other 
speech (either pro- or anti-Bush), and given the same instructions. Both messages 
were written to discuss similar issues and have a similar style, and the order in 
which participants read the messages (pro-Bush or anti-Bush first) was 
counterbalanced.  The sources spoke for an average of 73 seconds (SD = 21.89), 
and this was not different between speech directions. After the participants had 
delivered this second speech, they were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment and thanked for their participation.   
Phase II: Participants 
Seventy-two undergraduate students at Indiana University participated in the 
second phase of the experiment for partial course credit.  One participant had to 
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be dropped because they reported knowing the speaker, and one participant had to 
be dropped because they could read the Chinese characters in the implicit 
measure, leaving a total of 70 participants in the second phase. 
Phase II: Procedure 
After agreeing to participate in the experiment, participants were informed 
that the study was about communicating opinions.  They were told that they 
would complete a brief computer task and then answer some questions about 
President Bush.  After this, they would watch a video, do another computer-based 
task, and then answer more questions about President Bush.  These participants 
completed the same AMP and explicit questions as participants in the first phase.  
After this, they were randomly assigned one of the videos made during the first 
phase, and watched the source delivering either the pro-Bush or anti-Bush 
message. 
Once they watched the video, they rated their agreement to three statements 
on a seven-point Likert scale: “The speech was very supportive of the President,” 
“The speaker has a very positive attitude towards the President,” and “The 
speaker was very certain of his or her attitude towards the President.”  Next, they 
completed a second AMP and set of explicit questions so we could measure the 
change in their attitudes.  To encourage these participants to thoughtfully consider 
their agreement with the statements in the second explicit measure, we had them 
rate their agreement with the statements from the second (oppositely phrased) list 
of statements.  For example, if the participant first rated their agreement with the 
statement, “President Bush’s presidency has been a success,” they would then rate 
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their agreement with the statement, “President Bush’s presidency has been a 
failure.” 
Results 
The Affect Misattribution Paradigm (AMP) compares the affect elicited by 
photographs of the President to the affect elicited by similar photographs of 
strangers. To quantify this affective difference, the measure compares the 
categorization of Chinese characters that were preceded by a photograph of the 
President to those that were preceded by a photograph of someone else.  The 
actual AMP score is the difference in the proportion of characters categorized as 
‘good’ when preceded by a photograph of the President and the proportion 
categorized as ‘good’ when preceded by a photograph of someone else.  Thus, the 
more characters categorized as good after seeing a picture of Bush relative to the 
number categorized as good after seeing a picture of someone else, the more 
positive their implicit attitude towards Bush.  The most favorable (pro-Bush) 
AMP score is 1 and the most negative (anti-Bush) AMP score is -1.  
The explicit questions that were framed negatively were reverse-coded so all 
questions were scored such that 7 meant very positive attitudes towards Bush.  
There were no significant differences between the two (oppositely phrased) lists 
of twelve questions, so this counterbalancing variable was left out of all further 
analyses.  The twelve explicit questions were found to be very internally 
consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95), and a principle component factor analysis 
revealed all twelve questions loaded on a single component that accounted for 
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69.41% of the variance, so they were averaged together to yield a single measure 
of the source’s explicit attitude towards Bush. 
Distribution of the sources’ attitudes 
The distribution of the sources’ implicit and explicit attitudes towards Bush is 
shown in Figure 2a.  The implicit attitudes are highly clustered around the neutral 
point (0), but there were some participants who had very strong positive or 
negative implicit attitudes towards President Bush.  The average AMP score was -
0.042 (SD = 0.44), which was not significantly different from 0.   
The sources had a wide range of explicit attitudes towards Bush, with a mean 
of 3.53 (SD = 1.56), just slightly negative towards Bush, which was also not 
significantly different from the neutral point (4).  It is easily seen from Figure 2a 
that participants’ implicit and explicit attitudes towards President Bush are not 
perfectly congruent, and in fact the correlation between the measures was only 
0.37, which was not significantly different from 0.  However, there were no 
participants that had strong implicit attitudes and strong explicit attitudes that 
were incongruent.   
The average rating of Bush on the feeling thermometer was 43.67 (SD = 28.5) 
(slightly but not significantly cool towards Bush), and this measure was 
moderately correlated with the sources’ AMP (r = 0.421, p < 0.05) and highly 
correlated with the sources’ explicit rating of Bush (r = 0.872, p < 0.001).  
Distribution of recipients’ initial attitudes  
 Again, the explicit questions were highly internally consistent (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.96), and loaded on a single factor that accounted for 69.01% of the 
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variance, so the questions were averaged to create a single measure of explicit 
attitudes towards Bush.  The distribution of the recipients’ implicit and explicit 
attitudes towards Bush is shown in Figure 2b.  As can be seen, the recipients had a 
wide range of implicit and explicit attitudes towards Bush.  The average AMP 
score was -0.03 (SD = 0.52), and the average explicit attitude was 3.79 (SD = 1.7), 
comparable to the values of the sources’ implicit and explicit attitudes.  The 
average feeling thermometer was 45.93 (SD = 32.11).  The random assignment of 
participants to pro- or anti-Bush speeches and to source videos was effective: 
there were no significant differences in the initial attitudes of the recipients in 
either condition, and there were no significant correlations between the sources’ 
attitudes and the recipients’ initial attitudes.  The recipients’ implicit and explicit 
attitudes were significantly correlated, however (r = 0.707, p < 0.001).  The 
feeling thermometer was also significantly correlated with the recipients’ initial 
implicit (r = 0.671, p < 0.001) and explicit (r = 0.921, p < 0.001) attitudes.  It was 
not necessary for the recipients to have congruent or incongruent attitudes, but it 
can be seen in Figure 2b that incongruent implicit and explicit attitudes sometimes 
existed. 
Recipient ratings of the source and message 
After watching the video of the source delivering the pro- or anti-Bush 
message, they were asked to rate how positive the speech was towards Bush, how 
positive the speaker was towards Bush, and how certain the speaker seemed to be 
about his / her attitude.  The recipients’ rating for each of these questions was 
subjected to an ANCOVA, with the direction of speech as a fixed factor and the 
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speakers’ implicit and explicit attitudes and thermometer ratings as covariates.  
For the rating of the positivity of the speech, the only significant factor was the 
direction of the speech (F(1,64) = 552.831, p < 0.001), which simply indicates the 
recipients understood the meaning of the speech.  For the rating of the positivity 
of the speaker, however, in addition to the main effect of the direction of the 
speech (F(1, 64) = 248.113, p < 0.001), there was also an effect of the source’s 
implicit attitude (F(1, 64) = 5.77, p < 0.05), such that more positive implicit 
attitudes led to a lower perceived positivity of the speaker.  The implications of 
this result will be discussed later. 
The source’s implicit attitude had a similar effect on the recipients’ ratings of 
the certainty of the speaker.  The more positive the source’s implicit attitude 
towards Bush, the less certain they seemed to the recipient, (F(1, 64) = 6.027, p < 
0.05).  The analysis included the source’s explicit attitude and the direction of 
speech, which means that this is not an effect of the sources’ implicit attitudes 
conflicting with the message they were delivering or their explicit attitudes.  
Instead it means that, ceteris paribus, the more negative the source was implicitly 
towards Bush, the more certain they seemed to the recipient. 
The influence of the source on the recipients’ attitudes. 
The main hypothesis was that the implicit attitude of the source would have an 
assimilative effect on the recipients’ attitudes independent of the effect of the 
sources’ explicit attitudes or the content of the speech.  The influence of the 
source on the recipient is measured by the change in the recipients’ attitudes after 
watching the video of one of the sources.  Again, these differences were subjected 
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to an ANCOVA with the direction of speech as a fixed factor and the speakers’ 
implicit and explicit attitudes and thermometer ratings as covariates. 
The change in the recipients’ AMP scores was normally distributed with a 
mean of -0.013 (SD = 0.33).  There were no significant predictors of the change in 
the recipients’ implicit attitudes, implying that there is no clear cause for the 
participants’ change in attitudes beyond noise in the measure. 
The change in the recipients’ explicit scores was also normally distributed 
with a mean of -0.057 (SD = 0.552).  Again, there were no significant predictors 
of the change in explicit attitude, although the direction of the speech trended in 
the expected direction, such that pro-Bush speeches led to positive change and 
anti-Bush speeches led to negative change (see Figure 3). 
Six of the recipients failed to complete the second thermometer rating, so they 
were excluded from the relevant analysis.  The change in the recipient’s 
thermometer was normally distributed with a mean of -0.936 (SD = 5.11).  In this 
case, the sources’ own thermometer rating had a marginally significant effect on 
the recipients ratings (F(1, 58) = 2.826, p < 0.1), such that the warmer the source 
felt towards the President, the more positive the change in the recipients’ 
thermometer rating. 
Contrary to predictions, the implicit attitude of the source did not seem to 
influence the change in the recipients’ attitudes.  There were a large number of 
sources with relatively neutral implicit attitudes, so it could be of interest to focus 
the analysis only to those sources with non-neutral implicit attitudes.  Because 
AMP scores are symmetric around 0, the sources with an absolute AMP score less 
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than 0.2 were excluded.  In this way the variability in the implicit attitudes is 
retained while removing the large portion (N = 14) of sources with essentially no 
meaningful implicit attitude toward Bush.  The remaining 10 source participants 
had an average AMP score of -0.057 (SD = 0.69), an average explicit rating of 
3.25 (SD = 1.41) and an average thermometer rating of 36.2 (SD = 26.73), none of 
which were significantly different from the neutral points on their respective 
scales.   
There were 25 recipients who watched the videos of these 10 sources with 
non-neutral implicit attitudes, 13 in the pro-Bush condition and 12 in the anti-
Bush condition.  The analysis of the ratings of the sources was similar to the 
analysis with all of the sources.  The only significant effect on the rating of the 
positivity of the speech was the direction of the speech, F(1, 20) = 165.407, p < 
0.001.  The direction of the speech also significantly affected the rating of the 
positivity of the speaker (F(1, 20) = 119.577, p < 0.001), and there was a reverse 
effect of the source’s implicit attitude (F(1, 20) = 4.22, p = 0.05); the more 
negative the sources’ implicit attitudes, the more positive the recipient rated the 
speaker’s attitude towards Bush.  And finally, the source’s implicit attitude was 
the only (marginally) reliable predictor of the rating of the certainty of the speaker 
(F(1, 20) = 3.656, p < 0.08), such that more positive the speaker’s implicit 
attitudes towards Bush, the less certain he or she seemed to the recipient. 
Thus, even with the reduced number of sources, the basic results of the first 
part of the analysis with all of the sources are replicated.  When looking at the 
change in recipients’ attitudes, however, there is an interesting difference.  While 
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there is still no significant effect of the source on the change in the recipients’ 
implicit attitudes, when focusing only on those sources with strong implicit 
attitudes there is a significant effect of those implicit attitudes on the recipients’ 
explicit attitudes. As can be seen in Figure 4, there is a standard persuasion effect 
that is marginally significant, (F(1, 20) = 3.203, p < 0.10), such that pro-Bush 
messages tend to raise the explicit rating of Bush and vice-versa. However, there 
is also a distinct, significant negative trend (F(1, 20) = 6.149, p < 0.05) such that 
sources with more positive implicit attitudes towards Bush had a more negative 
effect on the recipients’ explicit ratings. When including the two-way interaction 
between the sources’ implicit and explicit attitudes in the model, there are no 
significant predictors of the change in the recipients’ explicit attitudes, implicit 
attitudes, or thermometer ratings. 
Discussion 
In this study, the pre-existing attitudes of the source participants towards the 
President were measured, and they delivered one persuasive message in favor and 
one opposed to the President.  The effect of this message on recipients’ attitudes 
was measured, with the prediction that the implicit attitudes of the source would 
have an effect on the recipients’ attitudes independent from the source’s explicit 
attitudes or the content of the persuasive message.  The attitudes of the sources 
varied widely and their implicit and explicit attitudes were only marginally 
correlated.  There were many sources with relatively neutral implicit attitudes, but 
there were a few that had strong explicit and neutral implicit, or strong implicit 
and neutral explicit attitudes.  However, there were no sources with conflicting 
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strong implicit and explicit attitudes, so the strongest test of the hypothesis was 
not possible.  
Unfortunately, there seemed to be no systematic change in either the 
recipients’ explicit or implicit attitudes.  There seemed to be no effect of the 
content of the message, the source’s explicit attitude, the source’s implicit 
attitude, or the source’s feeling about Bush (as measured by the thermometer) on 
the recipients’ implicit or explicit attitudes.  There did seem to be a small effect of 
the source’s thermometer rating on the change in the recipients’ thermometer 
rating, but overall it seemed that the main hypothesis was not confirmed. 
Although the recipients’ attitudes did not seem to be affected by the source’s 
implicit attitudes, there was evidence that they could detect the implicit attitude.  
The recipients rated the positivity of the message, the positivity of the source, and 
the certainty of the source.  The implicit attitude of the source seems to have 
affected the perceptions of the positivity and certainty of the source such that 
more positive attitudes towards the source led to lower perceptions of positivity 
and lower perceptions of certainty.  These effects were independent of the 
source’s explicit attitudes or the message content.  Thus, the source’s implicit 
attitude seems to have had an opposite effect on the perceptions of their attitude. 
Additionally, when focusing only on those sources with non-neutral implicit 
attitudes, the sources’ implicit attitudes predicted a change in the recipients’ 
explicit attitudes, independent of the sources’ explicit attitudes.  Again, this effect 
was opposite the expected direction, so those with more positive implicit attitudes 
towards Bush caused the recipients of their messages to explicitly become more 
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negative towards Bush.  This corresponds with their perception of the source’s 
attitude, which was also negatively correlated with the sources’ implicit attitudes. 
It is unclear why the sources’ implicit attitudes had a reverse effect on the 
recipients.  As can be seen in Figure 4, there is no interaction between the 
source’s implicit attitudes and the direction of the speech, so the reverse change in 
the recipients’ attitudes is not caused by sources delivering a speech that 
contradicted their implicit attitudes.   
Since the source’s attitudes were measured rather than manipulated, this is a 
correlational study and it is possible that people who are pro-Bush differ from 
those that are anti-Bush, such that their nonverbal behaviors communicate 
different things.  For instance, persons who hold anti-Bush attitudes may be more 
authoritarian and therefore seem more certain of their attitudes.  Similarly, some 
variable that was not measured could be correlated with positive or negative 
attitudes towards Bush and cause recipients to interpret their behavior opposite 
from their true attitude, so the speakers are perceived to be more positive when in 
fact they are more negative, subsequently affecting the persuasiveness of the 
speech. 
To gain greater control over these possible confounding variables, Study 2 is 
an experimental design with the attitudes of the source manipulated rather than 
measured. 
Study 2 
In order to have greater control over the sources’ attitudes, they had to be 
about a novel attitude object – a fictitious person named “Bob” – and therefore 
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were not as well-established as naturally occurring attitudes, but the recipients’ 
attitudes were entirely based on the sources’ communication. This design also 
allowed experimental control over the attitudes of the source, ensuring that their 
implicit and explicit attitudes were truly orthogonal. In addition, rather than 
watching recording the of source’s impression of the target, the recipient directly 
interacted with the source.  While this may have created more variability in the 
source’s communication, it also allowed more information to be conveyed 
through nonverbal communication.  
The main hypothesis of this study is that the source will communicate her / his 
implicit attitudes through nonverbal behaviors, independent of the verbal 
communication to the recipient.  This could be conveyed through facial 
expressions, body language, or the manner in which she / he describes Bob to the 
recipient.  The source’s implicit attitude could directly affect the recipients’ 
attitudes towards Bob, or could moderate the effect of the source’s explicit 
attitude. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-seven pairs of undergraduate students from Indiana University 
participated in this study for partial course credit, for a total of 94 participants.   
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the role of the source or the recipient.  
After receiving basic information about the purpose of the experiment, the 
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participant assigned to the role of the recipient was asked to wait in a private 
cubicle until their part of the experiment began. 
The participant assigned to the role of the source was told that they would be 
forming an impression of a person named ‘Bob’, and after answering some 
questions about their impression and doing a short computer task, they would then 
communicate their impression to the other participant, and that this discussion 
would be video taped.  They were then sat in front of a computer where they 
began the task of forming an impression about ‘Bob’. 
The purpose of this impression formation task was to independently 
manipulate the source’s implicit and explicit attitudes towards the fictional person 
‘Bob’.  To accomplish this, we used the paradigm developed by Rydell et al. 
(2006).  In this paradigm, participants were presented with a picture of Bob and a 
corresponding behavior, which they were asked to categorize as characteristic or 
uncharacteristic of Bob. Half of the participants were given feedback that the 
positive behaviors were characteristic of Bob, and the other half were given 
feedback indicating the negative behaviors were characteristic of him.  Unknown 
to the participants, immediately prior to the presentation of the picture of Bob, an 
evaluative prime was subliminally presented.  Half of the participants were given 
positive evaluative primes (e.g., “happy”, “sunshine”) and the other half was 
given negative primes (e.g, “pain”, “guilt”).  All participants were asked to 
categorize the same 100 behaviors (50 positive and 50 negative), and 
consequently were presented with 100 subliminal (all positive or all negative) 
evaluative primes.  This allowed the participants to form an explicit attitude 
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through the categorization of the behaviors, and develop an independent implicit 
attitude through the classical conditioning by the primes (c.f., Olson & Fazio, 
2001).  Thus, when the primes and behaviors have congruent valences, the 
participants’ explicit and implicit attitudes should be congruent, but when the 
primes are positive but the behaviors are negative, or vice-versa, the attitudes of 
the participant should be incongruent. 
Once the sources formed their impressions of Bob (and their implicit attitudes 
were correspondingly shaped), they were given an IAT measure of their implicit 
attitudes towards Bob. The IAT was used in this study rather than the AMP 
because the previous work using this paradigm used the IAT to measure the 
influence of the primes. 
Implicit Association Test. 
In this IAT there were five blocks, only two of which were the “critical 
blocks” that constitute the measure of the implicit attitude.  At the beginning of 
the task participants were told that we were interested in their ability to categorize 
objects while distracted.  Participants were informed that they would be 
categorizing pictures and words, and that they should be as fast as possible while 
minimizing errors.   
In Block 1, participants were asked to categorize a randomly ordered 
presentation of 10 positive and 10 negative words as “good” or “bad” by pressing 
the ‘a’ or ‘5’ keys (respectively) on the keyboard.  
In Block 2, they were instructed to categorize pictures as ‘Bob’ or ‘Not Bob’ 
using the same keys.  For this block they were given corrective feedback after 
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their categorization response.  They did this twenty times with a random 
presentation of the picture of ‘Bob’ and 5 pictures of similar White males. 
Block 3 was the first critical block, in which the participants had to respond to 
the picture of ‘Bob’ and good words with the ‘a’ key and respond to pictures of 
‘Not Bob’ and bad words with the ‘5’ key.  This will be referred to as the 
‘compatible’ block (although in actuality it was only compatible for half of the 
participants).  Participants categorized forty trials of alternating words and 
pictures randomly sampled from all of the words and pictures.  They were then 
told that the pictures were going to be reversed, and that they would have a 
chance to practice this new combination.   
Block 4 was the same as Block 2, only now the keys were reversed, so 
participants had to respond to pictures of ‘not Bob’ with the ‘a’ key and respond 
to the picture of Bob with the ‘5’ key.  As in Block 2, there were twenty trials, the 
order of the pictures was randomized, and they received corrective feedback after 
their categorization responses.   
Block 5 was the second critical block, and was similar to Block 3, only now 
pictures of ‘Not Bob’ and good words were paired with the ‘a’ key, and the 
picture of ‘Bob’ and bad words were paired with the ‘5’ key.  This will be 
referred to as the ‘incompatible’ block.  As in Block 3, participants had forty 
categorization trials. 
After they completed the IAT, they were asked to rate Bob on a series of six 
bipolar evaluative scales, such as, “Rate Bob on a scale from very agreeable (9) to 
very disagreeable (1).”  This constituted the measure of the source’s explicit 
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attitude towards Bob.  After this they completed a feeling thermometer towards 
Bob, and then were told that this part of the experiment was over, and that they 
should contact the experimenter.   
When the participant did so, the experimenter informed the other participant 
(assigned to the role of the recipient) that it was time for their participation.  The 
experimenter led both participants to a room with two chairs and a video camera.  
The experimenter informed the participants that this was a study on forming and 
communicating impressions, and that the job of the source was to communicate 
their impression about the person they just learned about.  They were told to start 
by saying his name, and then describe him as though they were going to introduce 
him to the other participant.  The recipients were given a picture of Bob and told 
that their job was to form an impression of Bob based on what the source told 
them, and that afterwards they would complete a short computer task and answer 
some questions about Bob.  The experimenter then began recording, and left the 
room (but remained within earshot). 
After the source finished describing ‘Bob’, the experimenter came back into 
the room, stopped the video recording, thanked the source for their participation 
and debriefed them about the purpose of the experiment.  The recipient was 
reminded that they would complete a short computer task and answer some 
questions about Bob.  The recipient then completed the same IAT described 
above, rated Bob on the same 6 semantic differential scales, and completed the 
same feeling thermometer.  When they had completed these measures, they were 
thanked for their participation and debriefed about the purpose of the experiment. 
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Results 
Manipulation of source’s implicit and explicit attitudes 
To be sure that the manipulation of the source’s implicit and explicit attitudes 
was successful, the effect of the primes and behaviors on the source’s IAT scores 
and explicit ratings of ‘Bob’ was examined.  The prediction was that the primes 
would affect the sources’ implicit attitudes independent of the behaviors, and the 
behaviors would predict the explicit ratings independent of the primes.  To test 
this, we conducted a 2 (primes; positive / negative) x 2 (behaviors; positive / 
negative) ANOVA on the IAT scores and the explicit ratings. 
The explicit ratings consisted of six 9-point semantic differential scales with 
different endpoints (see Appendix C).  The ratings were highly consistent 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.983), and a principal components analysis revealed all of 
the questions loaded on a single factor that accounted for 92.07% of the variance, 
so a single explicit rating was created from the average of the six scales (with the 
appropriate questions reverse-scored).  Across all subjects in all conditions the 
average rating was 4.98 (SD = 3.704), very close to (and not significantly 
different from) the neutral point (5) on the scale.  The distribution of explicit 
attitudes was highly non-normal (in fact, highly bimodal; see Figure 5a), and the 
error variance was significantly unequal across conditions (Levene’s F(3, 43) = 
6.7, p < 0.001), so the analyses were done on the ranks of the average ratings.  
These rank values were subjected to a 2 (behaviors; positive / negative) x 2 
(primes; positive / negative) ANOVA, and the behaviors were the only significant 
predictor of the explicit rating ranks, F(1, 43) = 150.629, p < 0.001.  As can be 
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seen in Figure 5a, the behaviors had a very strong effect (η2 = 0.778) in the 
predicted direction and there was no significant effect of the Primes. 
To calculate the IAT scores, we followed the procedure suggested by 
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003).  The resulting score, D, is the difference in 
reaction times on the compatible and incompatible trials (Blocks 3 & 5), divided 
by the standard deviation of the reaction times from both blocks.  This measure is 
more consistent across varying response times and does not require the exclusion 
of very long or very short reaction times.  Across all conditions, the average D 
was -0.3 (SD = 0.432), which is slightly negative towards Bob, and this was 
significantly different from the neutral point, 0, t(46) = -4.794, p < 0.001.  It is 
unclear why the participants formed a negative impression towards Bob, and this 
will be discussed later in the manuscript. 
When the sources’ IAT scores were subjected to the 2 x 2 ANOVA, the 
results were surprising.  Instead of the primes predicting the IAT scores 
independent of the behaviors, the behaviors were predicting the scores 
independent of the primes, and in the opposite direction to that predicted (see 
Figure 5b).  This effect was reliable but small, F(1, 43) = 6.236, p < 0.05, η2 = 
0.127.  It appears from Figure 5b that the primes had the predicted effect with the 
positive behaviors, but this trend was not reliable. 
Surprisingly, this result actually replicates the findings of Rydell et al. (2006).  
In their study, they only looked at the conditions with incongruent behaviors and 
primes.  Exclusively looking at the incongruent conditions, it could appear with 
this data that behaviors predicted explicit ratings and the primes predicted the 
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implicit attitudes.  However, when looking at both congruent and incongruent 
conditions, it appears that the implicit attitudes were simply influenced by the 
behaviors, but opposite the expected direction.  The implications of this will be 
elaborated in the discussion.  Fortunately, even though the manipulation did not 
have the predicted effect, it was still possible to test the main hypotheses.  As can 
be seen in Figure 6a, there are sources with congruent and incongruent implicit 
and explicit attitudes, both positive and negative, so the independent effects of the 
sources’ attitudes on the recipients were examined. 
Effect of Source Attitudes on Recipients’ Impression 
For the two measures of the recipients’ attitudes – the explicit questions and 
the IAT – there are two possible predictors: the source’s explicit attitude and the 
source’s implicit attitude. As with the sources’ explicit attitudes, the recipients’ 
explicit attitudes were clearly bimodal (see figure 6b).  Nonetheless, the average 
explicit rating was 4.993 (SD = 2.99), which was not significantly different from 
the neutral point (5) or the sources’ explicit attitudes. 
To examine the independent effects of the source’s explicit and implicit 
attitudes on the recipients’ explicit attitudes, we conducted a simple regression 
with the explicit attitudes as the dependent variable and the sources’ attitudes as 
the predictors.  The entire model accounted for 80.5% of the variance (a fairly 
good fit), but the sources’ explicit attitudes were the only significant predictor of 
the recipients’ explicit attitudes, β = 0.929, p < 0.001.  The impact of the sources’ 
explicit attitudes is evident in Figure 7, and although it appears there is a trend for 
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more positive implicit attitudes in the source to lead to more positive explicit 
attitudes in the recipient, this effect was not significant. 
Next, the recipients’ implicit attitudes were examined. Three of the recipients 
failed to follow the instructions of the IAT and did not reverse their responses to 
the target and the foil in the practice block 4 or in the critical block 5, so had to be 
excluded from this analysis.  The average IAT score for the remaining recipients 
was -0.398 (SD = 0.437), which was significantly different from the neutral point 
(0), t(43) = -6.037, p < 0.001, but not significantly different from the sources’ 
implicit attitudes.  This general negativity corresponds with source’s implicit 
negativity, which will be discussed later.  To determine the effect of the sources’ 
attitudes on the recipients’ implicit attitudes, the same regression was conducted 
on the recipients’ IAT scores as was done for their explicit ratings. In this case the 
model did not fit particularly well (R2 = 0.138), and the only significant predictor 
was the sources’ explicit attitudes (β = -0.374, p < 0.05) (see Figure 8), which 
was negatively related to the recipients’ IAT scores.  The sources with more 
positive explicit attitudes towards the target negatively influenced the recipients’ 
implicit attitudes. 
Discussion 
In this study, the source’s attitudes were manipulated rather than measured.  
To induce congruent or incongruent explicit and implicit attitudes, we borrowed a 
paradigm from Rydell et al. (2006).  The manipulation seems to have exactly the 
predicted effect on the explicit ratings of the target – the feedback they received 
while categorizing behaviors as characteristic or uncharacteristic of the target 
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influenced their explicit attitude towards the target in the expected direction, and 
the primes had no effect on the ratings.  This effect was strong and very reliable, 
and accords with previous work on impression formation (Asch, 1946; Hamilton 
& Sherman, 1996; Kerpelman & Himmelfarb, 1971). 
The manipulation of the implicit attitudes did not have the predicted effect, 
however.  Based on the results of Rydell et al. (2006), the primes were expected 
to affect the IAT scores independent of the behaviors.  However, instead it was 
found that the behaviors negatively predicted the IATs, so positive behaviors led 
to more negative IATs and negative behaviors led to more positive IATs.  In 
addition to this effect of the behaviors, there was also an overall tendency for the 
sources to have a negative implicit attitude towards the target.  By observing the 
recordings of the sources communicating their impression of the target to the 
recipient, it is possible to make inferences about why this effect may have 
occurred.  In both conditions, the sources described the target as impossibly 
extreme, so that when they were receiving feedback that the positive behaviors 
were characteristic of ‘Bob’, they described him as the perfect human being; one 
participant even said, “Basically, the only person more perfect than this guy is 
Jesus.”  And in the negative condition one participant explained, “This guy is the 
worst possible person you can imagine.”   
It is possible that this extremity in the good condition caused a comparative 
reaction, so participants implicitly didn’t like the target because he was too good.  
This is comparable to the findings of Herr et al. (1983), who found that moderate 
primes led to assimilative judgments, whereas extreme primes led to contrast.  
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Another possibility is that although participants were told that the behaviors were 
merely characteristic of the target and not necessarily actual behaviors of the 
target, the impression formation task may have led the participants to incorporate 
all behaviors in their impression.  While the individual behaviors were believable, 
when put in combination they may have seemed impossible, causing participants 
to form an opposite automatic evaluation.  
This result has implications for the work using the manipulation because it 
does not contradict the findings from the original study (Rydell et al., 2006).  In 
that study, they were focused on showing that incongruent implicit and explicit 
attitudes could be induced in participants and that these attitudes could be 
reversed.  Naturally, the researchers attributed the negative implicit attitudes to 
the primes, but they did not have a congruent condition as a control. It is possible 
that it was the behaviors causing the incongruent explicit and implicit attitudes, as 
they did in this study.   One goal of Study 3 was to make the behaviors of the 
target more believable when taken as a whole, and see if this effect of the 
behaviors on the implicit attitudes of the source is replicated. 
Despite this unpredicted effect of the manipulation on the source’s attitudes, 
there was still enough variation in the sources’ attitudes to examine the effect of 
the sources’ attitudes on the recipients.  Unfortunately, the predicted effect of the 
sources’ implicit attitude on recipients’ attitudes independent of the sources’ 
explicit attitudes was not found.  However, the recipients seemed to have formed 
their impression of the target in the same way as the sources: sources with 
positive explicit attitudes towards the target induced a negative implicit attitude in 
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the recipient, just like positive behaviors induced a negative implicit attitude in 
the source.  Additionally, there was an overall tendency for the recipients to have 
a negative implicit attitude towards the target, just like the sources’ implicit 
attitudes.   
A likely explanation for this is that the source communicated their explicit 
impression of the target so faithfully that the recipients developed the same 
distribution of implicit and explicit attitudes.  This implies that it must have been 
the content of the behaviors that induced the negative implicit attitudes and 
caused the positive explicit impression to negatively affect the implicit attitudes 
of the recipient.  In Study 3, we reduced the extremity and increased the 
believability of the overall impression by making the whole set of behaviors 
consistent and possible to have come from a single person in the hopes that this 
would eliminate the effect of the behaviors / explicit attitudes on the implicit 
attitudes of the person forming the impression. 
Study 3 
In Studies 1 and 2, the source was communicating his / her impression of the 
target (i.e., Bush or ‘Bob’) to a recipient.  However, it could be that a person’s 
implicit attitudes are most evident in his / her behavior when he / she is 
interacting with the target of the attitude.  For instance, in Dovidio, Kawakami, 
and Gaertner (2002) and in the original validation of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 
1998), the participant interacted with a member of the out-group, and those 
interactions were correlated with his / her responses on the implicit measures.  
Therefore, the goal of this study was to see if the implicit attitudes of the source 
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were revealed in an interaction with the target of the attitude, and if the behavior 
guided by these implicit attitudes would influence the attitudes of an observer of 
the interaction. 
In addition, it was of interest whether the manipulation of implicit and explicit 
attitudes used in Study 2 would result in the same, unpredicted pattern in which 
the explicit categorization of behaviors incongruently affected the implicit 
attitudes of the source independent of the primes.  As mentioned in the discussion 
of Study 2, one possible explanation for the reaction to the behaviors was the 
extremity implied by all of the behaviors together.  To lessen this possibility, and 
to ensure that the same, college-aged person (the confederate) could have 
realistically performed all of the behaviors, we selected a subset from the original 
list of behaviors to use as stimuli in this study. 
Methods 
Phase I: Participants 
Twenty-one undergraduate students from Indiana University participated in 
the first phase of the experiment for partial course credit.  One participants’ data 
had to be dropped because he / she failed to complete the IAT. 
Phase I: Procedure 
After agreeing to participate in the experiment, the participants were told that 
the study was about forming impressions of people, and that we were interested in 
how the manner in which one learns about a person affects the way he or she 
interacts with them. There were told participants were recruited from another 
study in which friends and acquaintances were asked to share experiences they 
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had with these participants, and they would learn about one of these participants.  
They were told we took the stories collected from the participant’s friends and 
acquaintances and condensed them into short descriptions of the behaviors, and 
then made another list of behaviors that we judged to be uncharacteristic of the 
participant.  We told them they would learn about the participant by categorizing 
these behaviors as characteristic or uncharacteristic, and after answering some 
questions and completing a short computer task (the IAT), they would have a 
short discussion with him. 
Once they heard the instructions and had any questions answered, the 
participants sat in front of a computer to form an impression of ‘Matt,’ the target.  
The procedure was the same as that in Study 2, but instead of the picture of ‘Bob’, 
there was a picture of the confederate, and the set of behaviors was reduced from 
Study 2 (see Appendix D).   
After forming an impression of Matt, the source rated the confederate on the 
same six semantic differential scales (except they were 7-point instead of 9-point) 
and completed the same IAT as in Study 2. For the IAT in this study the single 
picture of ‘Bob’ was replaced with five pictures of the confederate (including the 
one used in the impression formation task).  The source was then asked to identify 
the 10 subliminal primes from a list of 20 positive and 20 negative words (or to 
guess, if they could not identify any) as a manipulation check.  They were then 
told they were going to meet Matt, and led to a room with two chairs and a video 
camera.   
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The confederate, who was blind to the participants’ condition, was sitting in 
one of the chairs, and the experimenter thanked them both for their participation 
(to maintain the cover story).  The experimenter then started the camera while 
explaining that they would have 3 minutes to discuss the topic of, “Things to Do 
in Town.”  This topic was chosen to be personally interesting to the participants 
without requiring the confederate to reveal too much personal information that 
might bias the participants’ reactions or contradict the impression they formed of 
him.  The confederate was trained to engage in the conversation in a consistent 
manner that was not too friendly or unfriendly while keeping the conversation as 
natural as possible. 
After the conversation, the confederate was thanked and asked to stay in the 
room, and the participant was taken to another room where they were given a 
process debriefing in which the suspicions of the participant were gradually 
probed while also informing the participant about the nature and purpose of the 
experiment.  During this time, the confederate rated the participant and the 
interaction on six Likert scales (see Appendix E).  After it was explained that 
‘Matt’ was a confederate and that the behaviors they read about him were 
fabricated, they were given an opportunity to talk to Matt and ask any questions 
they might have.  After they were done, they were thanked for their participation 
and allowed to leave. 
Phase II: Participants 
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Thirty-eight people from Bloomington, Indiana (mostly undergraduate 
students at Indiana University) received eight dollars in compensation for their 
participation in the second part of the study. 
Phase II: Procedure 
After they agreed to participate in the experiment, the experimenter informed 
them that we were interested in how different parts of an interaction influence the 
way a person forms an impression. The recipients formed an impression of the 
target by watching one of the recorded interactions between the confederate and 
the participant. To ensure that the impression they were forming of the 
confederate was based primarily on the behavior of the participant, one half of the 
frame was replaced with a picture of the confederate (the same picture used in the 
impression formation procedure in the first part of the study), so the recipients 
could only see the behavior of the participant (see Figure 9). 
Once they had watched the video interaction, the participants completed the 
same IAT and answered the same explicit questions as the participants in the first 
phase of the experiment.  After completing these, they were asked if they felt they 
were able to form an impression of the target, and then were debriefed on the 
purpose of the experiment. 
Results 
Sources’ Awareness of Primes 
The sources were given a randomized list of 40 words and asked to circle the 
10 that were primes.  Therefore, 10 of the words were correct, and 10 others were 
of the same valence.  The probability of correctly circling 6 or more of the words 
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by chance is < 0.05, and 7 of the 20 sources did so, indicating they were able to 
see the primes.  However, in work using evaluative conditioning (e.g., Olson & 
Fazio, 2001) the primes were clearly perceptible, so it is possible the primes 
would still have had the desired effect.  Except where noted, the removal of these 
seven sources did not meaningfully change the results. 
Manipulation of Sources’ Implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
As in Study 2, the effect of the primes and behaviors on the source’s IAT 
scores and explicit ratings of ‘Matt’ was examined.  To replicate the results of 
Rydell and colleagues (2006), the primes should independently lead to changes in 
the implicit attitudes and the behaviors should independently lead to changes in 
explicit attitudes.  To replicate the results of Study 2, the behaviors should lead to 
congruent changes in explicit attitudes and incongruent changes in implicit 
attitudes.  To test this, a 2 (primes; positive / negative) x 2 (behaviors; positive / 
negative) ANOVA was conducted on the IAT scores and the explicit ratings. 
The six 7-point semantic differential scales were again tested for internal 
reliability, and they were again found to be highly consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.971), and a principal component analysis revealed all of the questions loaded on 
a single factor that accounted for 87.62% of the variance, so a single explicit 
rating was created from the average of the six scales (with appropriate questions 
reverse-scored).  The average rating across all subjects was 4.175 (SD = 2.373), 
slightly but not significantly negative.  The error variances were significantly 
different across conditions (Levene’s F(3,16) = 11.564, p < 0.001), so as before, 
the analysis was done on the ranks of the explicit ratings.  The 2 x 2 ANOVA 
 55
revealed a strong effect (η2 = 0.754) of the behaviors on the ranks of the explicit 
ratings, F(1,16) = 49.087, p < 0.001.  There was also a small (η2 = 0.172) but 
marginally reliable effect of the primes on the explicit attitudes, F(1,16) = 3.329, 
p < 0.09, such that negative primes led to more negative explicit attitudes.  This 
can be seen in Figure 10a.  When excluding those sources that correctly identified 
the primes, only the behaviors had a reliable effect on the sources’ explicit 
attitudes (F(1,9) = 36.45, p < 0.001) 
The source’s IAT scores were again calculated using the procedure suggested 
by Greenwald et al. (2003).  Across all conditions, the average D was -0.522 (SD 
= 0.425), which was significantly lower than neutral, t(19) = -5.486, p < 0.001.  It 
appears that all participants formed negative implicit attitudes towards the target.  
This replicates the general negativity found in Study 2, and will be discussed 
later.  When the IAT scores were subjected to the 2 x 2 ANOVA, the effects did 
not replicate those in Study 2.  In this case, primes had a small and marginally 
reliable effect on the sources’ IATs, F(1,16) = 3.262, p < 0.09, with positive 
primes leading to more negative IAT scores.  Behaviors did not have a reliable 
effect on the IATs.  It seems as though there is an interaction between the two 
(see Figure 10b), but the interaction was not significant.  However, when only 
looking at the sources who could not identify the primes, the effect of the primes 
on the sources’ implicit attitudes was still marginally significant (F(1,9) = 3.487, 
p < 0.1) in the reverse direction (so positive primes led to negative IATs), and the 
interaction was reliable (F(1,9) = 5.318, p < 0.05), so the reverse effect of the 
primes was very large with negative behaviors (post-hoc t(5) = 2.661, p < 0.04, 
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Cohen’s d = 2.13), but not significant with positive behaviors.  In either case, it 
seems as though the primes had the opposite effect from what was predicted, 
particularly when looking at the negative behaviors.  
Comparing sources’ attitudes in Study 2 and 3  
It appears as though the procedure had different effects between the two 
studies.  Because essentially the same procedure was used to manipulate the 
sources’ implicit and explicit attitudes (Rydell et al., 2006) in Studies 2 and 3, it is 
possible to compare the studies on the dependent variables. The explicit ratings in 
Study 2 were on a nine-point scale and those in Study 3 were on a seven-point 
scale, so the scores were transformed to proportions such that the lowest value on 
the scale was 0, the midpoint was 0.5, and the highest was 1.0.  To examine the 
effect of the behaviors and primes across both studies, we conducted a 2 (Study 2 
v. Study 3) x 2 (positive v. negative behaviors) x 2 (positive v. negative primes) 
multivariate ANOVA with the sources’ IATs and explicit ratings of the target as 
the dependent variables.  However, Levene’s test revealed the error variances 
were significantly different between groups (F(7,92) = 3.213, p < 0.005), so the 
rank-transformed explicit ratings were used rather than the raw scores. 
There was no main effect of the change in procedure between experiments on 
the explicit ratings, and naturally the main effect of the behaviors on the explicit 
ratings remained highly significant (F(1,92) = 170.975, p < 0.001).  There was 
also a reliable interaction between the change in procedure and the effect of the 
behaviors on the explicit ratings, F(1,92) = 4.92, p < 0.05, such that the negative 
behaviors in Study 2 led to even more negative explicit ratings than those in Study 
 57
3.  This is exactly the effect we would expect, as the behaviors were made less 
extreme in Study 3. 
The effect of the changes in procedure on the sources’ implicit attitudes is 
somewhat more complex.  To begin with, there was a main effect of the changes 
in procedure, such that those in Study 3 had much more negative implicit attitudes 
towards the target (M = -0.52, SD = 0.425) than those in Study 2 (M = -0.285, SD 
= 0.443), F(1,92) = 5.309, p < 0.05.  The main effect of the behaviors on the 
implicit attitudes is reliable across studies, F(1,92) = 9.245, p < 0.005, such that 
positive behaviors led to more negative implicit attitudes than did negative 
behaviors.  This suggests that if the unexpected effect of the behaviors was due to 
the extremity of the behaviors in Study 2, reducing the extremity of the behaviors 
in Study 3 did not eliminate the effect.  There was also a marginal interaction 
between the change in procedure and the primes (F(1,92) = 2.84, p < 0.1), such 
that positive primes had a more negative effect on the implicit attitude in Study 3 
than in Study 2 (see Figure 11).  Because the primes were not changed between 
the studies, it seems as though the change in behaviors or the expectation for an 
interaction must have had an effect on the sources’ implicit attitudes. 
Effect of Source on Target 
Before examining the effect of the sources’ attitudes on the recipient, it is of 
interest to examine the interaction between the sources and the target (the 
confederate).  The target rated the sources and the interaction on six semantic 
differential scales.  Apparently, however, the target did not explicitly notice any 
differences in the participants’ behavior towards him.  The six scales were 
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included in a multivariate ANOVA (to control for covariance between the scales) 
with the primes and behaviors as categorical predictors and the sources’ implicit 
and explicit attitudes as covariates.  When looking at all of the sources or only 
those who could not identify the primes, neither the manipulation of the sources’ 
attitudes nor the sources’ attitude themselves significantly predicted the 
confederate’s ratings of the participants or the interaction.  
Effect of Source’s Attitudes on Recipient’s Impression Formation 
Although there were no sources with positive implicit and positive explicit 
attitudes (see Figure 12a), there was enough variability in the sources’ attitudes to 
examine the effect on the recipients.  Unlike the source’s bimodally distributed 
attitudes, the recipients’ implicit and explicit attitudes appear to be more normally 
distributed and centered in the quadrant of attitudes (relatively positive implicit 
and explicit attitudes) not occupied by the sources (Figure 12b).  The average 
explicit attitude was 5.39 (SD = 0.819) on the 7-point scale, which was 
significantly greater than neutral, t(37) = 10.47, p < 0.001, indicating that the 
recipients generally formed a positive explicit attitude towards the target.  This 
was also significantly greater than the sources’ explicit attitudes, as determined by 
a paired samples t-test (t(37) = -3.016, p < 0.005). 
To test the effect of the sources’ attitudes on the recipients’ explicit attitudes, 
the recipients’ explicit attitudes were submitted to a regression with the sources’ 
implicit and explicit attitudes as predictors. Unfortunately, the model accounted 
for only 1% of the variance, indicating that the sources’ attitudes had essentially 
no effect on the recipients’ explicit attitude. 
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The recipients’ average implicit attitude was -0.601 (SD = 0.314), which was 
significantly less than neutral, t(37) = -11.816, p < 0.001, indicating recipients 
generally formed a negative implicit attitude towards the target.  A paired t-test 
revealed this was not, however, significantly different from the sources’ implicit 
attitudes.  The recipients’ implicit attitudes were also fit to a regression model 
with the sources’ explicit and implicit attitudes as predictors, and again, the model 
had a very poor fit, accounting for only 6% of the variance. 
Noting that the sources’ explicit attitudes are bimodally distributed, their 
explicit attitudes were converted to a categorical variable using a median split.  
The recipients’ implicit and explicit attitudes were then subjected to a 2-way 
ANOVA with the sources’ median split explicit attitudes as a fixed factor and the 
sources’ implicit attitudes as a covariate.  In this case, the sources’ implicit and 
explicit attitudes showed no significant effect on the recipients’ explicit attitude, 
but the sources’ explicit attitude did have a marginal effect on the recipients’ 
implicit attitude, controlling for the sources’ implicit attitude, F(1,35) = 3.671, p 
< 0.065 (see Figure 13).  This effect is in the expected direction, so negative 
explicit attitudes in the source lead to negative implicit attitudes in the recipient 
(M = -0.693, SD = 0.3), and positive explicit attitudes lead to slightly less 
negative attitudes in the recipient (M = -0.509, SD = 0.313), but the effect size 
was very small (η2 = 0.095).  
Discussion 
In this study, the procedure to independently influence the sources’ implicit 
and explicit attitudes was the same as in Study 2, with only two meaningful 
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differences.  First, the behaviors attributed to the source were modified to be less 
extreme and more coherent (more plausibly committed by a college-aged White 
male).  Second, the participants anticipated interacting with the target after 
forming an impression of him, rather than anticipating describing the target to 
another person, and this can cause people to spend more time and cognitive effort 
on individuating information when forming the impression (Neuberg & Fiske, 
1987). 
These differences, either together or singularly, caused a change in the 
attitudes the sources formed towards the target.  Although the behaviors and not 
the primes were changed between the studies, the effect was on the sources’ 
implicit attitudes, not on the sources’ explicit attitudes.   
The effect of the behaviors on the explicit attitudes was consistent across 
experiments and with expectations.  When the sources categorized positive 
behaviors as characteristic of the target, they formed a positive explicit attitude 
towards him, and vice-versa.  This effect was somewhat attenuated in Study 3 
compared to Study 2, but this was expected, as the behaviors were less extreme in 
Study 3. 
The effect of the manipulation on the implicit attitudes, as mentioned, was 
quite different.  In this study, participants in every condition formed negative 
implicit attitudes towards the source except those who categorized negative 
behaviors and saw negative primes, which one might expect to be the most likely 
condition to form negative attitudes towards the target.  This differed from Study 
2 and from Rydell and colleagues’ (2006) study.  What seems to be certain, 
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however, is that the primes did not have the predicted effect, and the behaviors 
had a surprising reverse effect on the sources’ implicit attitudes when prior work 
suggested otherwise. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the procedure did not affect the implicit and 
explicit attitudes independently as expected, it was still possible to examine the 
effect of the sources’ attitudes towards the target on the recipients’ perception of 
the target. However, it appears that watching the video of the source interacting 
with the target was not enough to influence the recipients’ attitudes towards the 
target.  The sources’ implicit attitudes did not influence the recipients’ implicit or 
explicit attitudes towards the target, and the sources’ explicit attitudes did not 
have an effect on the recipients’ explicit attitudes.  There was a very small effect 
of the sources’ explicit attitudes on the recipients’ implicit attitudes, such that 
sources with positive attitudes caused the recipients to have a more positive 
implicit attitude towards the target. 
General Discussion 
The three studies reported here attempted to determine if a person’s implicit 
attitude has an influence independent from the person’s explicit attitudes on 
another person’s attitudes.  Using various techniques and in various situations, the 
implicit and explicit attitudes of a source of influence towards a target person 
were measured or manipulated, a recipient was given the opportunity to be 
influenced by the source, and the effect on the recipient’s attitudes towards the 
target was measured. 
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In the first study, the sources’ attitudes toward President Bush were measured, 
and they were asked to deliver a pro-Bush and an anti-Bush speech, which were 
videotaped.  After measuring the recipients’ attitudes toward President Bush, they 
watched one of these videotapes, and the change in their attitudes was measured.  
In line with standard persuasion studies, the direction of the speech affected the 
change in the recipients’ explicit attitudes towards Bush.  Additionally, when only 
looking at those sources that had non-neutral implicit attitudes, the sources’ 
implicit attitude affected the change in the recipients’ explicit attitude, but not in 
the expected direction, so those sources with positive implicit attitudes towards 
Bush caused the recipients to become explicitly more negative towards Bush, and 
vice-versa. 
For Studies 2 and 3, we borrowed a paradigm from Rydell and colleagues 
(2006) to independently manipulate the sources’ explicit and implicit attitudes 
towards a target person.  In this paradigm, participants categorized behaviors as 
characteristic or not characteristic of the target, and received feedback indicating 
that only positive or only negative behaviors were characteristic of the target.  
Simultaneously, positive or negative primes were subliminally presented prior to 
the picture of the target.  Surprisingly, the manipulation did not entirely work the 
way we expected.  In both studies, the corrective feedback in the categorization 
task had the predicted effect on the sources’ explicit attitudes.  When the 
participants learned that positive behaviors were characteristic of Bob they 
formed positive explicit attitudes towards Bob, and vice-versa.  However, in 
Study 2 it was the behaviors rather than the primes that influenced the sources’ 
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implicit attitudes, such that when positive behaviors were characteristic of the 
target it led to negative implicit attitudes, while negative behaviors led to more 
positive implicit attitudes. 
In Study 2, the sources then communicated their newly formed impressions to 
the recipient. The effect of the behaviors on the sources’ explicit attitudes appears 
to have been so strong as to cause the sources’ explicit attitudes to overwhelm any 
other source of influence on the recipient.  The recipients’ explicit attitudes were 
highly correlated with the sources’ explicit attitudes, indicating the sources 
effectively communicated their impression.  One surprising result was that the 
sources’ explicit attitudes negatively influenced the recipients’ implicit attitudes 
just as the behaviors negatively influenced the sources’ implicit attitudes.  It 
seems that the behaviors may have been so overpowering that they affected both 
the implicit and explicit attitude of the source, and affected the explicit attitude of 
the source so much that it affected both the implicit and explicit attitudes of the 
recipient. 
In Study 3, the behaviors being categorized as characteristic of the target were 
less extreme and more plausibly could have come from one person.  This change 
was implemented so that the participants would believe the person they were 
about to meet actually performed the behaviors they categorized as characteristic 
of him, and to reduce the possibility that the effect of the behaviors was 
overwhelming the effect of the primes.  This change had the expected effect on 
the sources’ explicit attitudes; corrective feedback that indicated positive 
behaviors were characteristic of the target led to positive explicit attitudes and 
 64
vice-versa, but the effect of the behaviors was attenuated, so the attitudes of the 
sources were less extreme.  However, the effect of the manipulation on the 
sources’ implicit attitudes was yet again different from predictions.  In Study 3 
there was an interaction between the primes and the behaviors, such that negative 
primes and negative behaviors led to relatively positive or neutral implicit 
attitudes towards the target, while all other combinations of primes and behaviors 
led to negative implicit attitudes. 
As opposed to Study 2, in which the sources directly communicated their 
impression to the recipients, the recipients in Study 3 formed their impression of 
the target by watching a videotape of the source interact with the target.  
However, it seems that this was not sufficient to convey the sources’ impression 
of the target.  There was almost no effect of the sources’ attitudes on the 
recipients’ explicit ratings or measures of their implicit attitudes.  There was one 
very small effect such that the recipients’ implicit attitudes were positively 
correlated with the source’s explicit attitudes.  The target, a confederate, also 
seemed unable to detect either the implicit or the explicit attitudes of the source. 
It is worth noting that the only situation in which we discovered an influence 
of a source’s implicit attitudes was when those attitudes were pre-existing rather 
than recently developed (Study 1).  It is possible that the method used to induce 
implicit attitudes in Studies 2 and 3, while sufficient to affect responses on a 
speeded-judgment task such as the IAT, was unable to affect participants’ 
automatic evaluations sufficiently to guide their nonverbal behavior in detectable 
ways. 
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It is also notable that Study 1 showed that a situation exists in which the 
source’s implicit attitudes influences the recipient.  Although the support for the 
main hypothesis was weak throughout the three studies reported here, it 
accomplished at the very least a proof of concept, that a person’s implicit attitude 
can have an independent influence on another person’s attitudes.  This influence 
was contrastive rather than assimilative in the first study, and the mechanism 
underlying this deserves further research. 
Finally, the consistent yet puzzling pattern of contrastive influence across the 
three studies is worth noting.  In Study 2, the target’s behaviors had a reverse 
effect on the sources’ implicit attitude.  In Study 3, however, it was the primes 
that had a reverse effect on the sources’ implicit attitudes.  In Study 1, the 
recipients’ explicit attitudes were contrasted away from the sources’ implicit 
attitudes.  In Study 2, however, it was the recipients’ implicit attitudes that were 
contrasted away from the sources’ explicit attitudes.  It is not clear whether there 
is some common thread underlying these results or what that common thread 
would be, but future research should bear in mind these unusual outcomes. 
There are at least two future lines of research suggested by the work presented 
here.  First, it would be useful to further delineate the situations in which a 
person’s implicit attitude has an effect on someone else that is independent from 
the person’s explicit attitude.  A natural first step is to study the situation in which 
the source has pre-existing attitudes towards a target (as in Study 1) and the 
recipient observes the source interacting with the target (as in Study 3).  
Considering that we found independent influence in a situation in which the 
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source had pre-existing attitudes, and that previous research has witnessed 
implicit attitudes guiding nonverbal behavior in situations in which the source is 
interacting with the target (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald et 
al., 1998), it seems that this situation might be the most likely to reveal the 
independent influence of implicit attitudes. 
It is also possible that the sources’ implicit attitude affected apects of the 
recipients’ attitude, such as their attitude certainty, which we did not measure in 
these studies.  Changes in certainty would have consequences for future 
persuasion attempts (Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007; Tormala & Petty, 
2002) and the stability of the attitude over time, which could be detected by 
seeing whether recipients are more influenced by subsequent persuasion attempts 
that were congruent with the sources’ implicit (but not explicit) attitudes. 
It might also be useful to simplify the situation and make the attitude object 
something other than a person.  Edwards (1990) induced oppositely valenced 
cognitively and affectively based attitudes towards a sports drink by providing 
positive or negative information about the drink, and then having participants 
taste the drink, which was either pleasant or unpleasant.  A procedure similar to 
this could be used to induce opposite implicit and explicit attitudes towards a 
drink, and the source could either try to persuade another person to choose the 
drink over another one, or the recipient could watch the source tasting the drink, 
or both, before choosing between it and another drink.   
It is also possible that people would have pre-existing, oppositely valenced 
implicit and explicit attitudes towards non-social objects.  Nosek (2007) surveyed 
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a large range of attitude objects and measured the correlations between implicit 
and explicit attitudes.  He found that certain objects, such as pants and skirts, had 
relatively low implicit-explicit correlations, and it may therefore be more likely 
that some people will have opposing implicit and explicit attitudes towards these 
objects.  Also, Friese, Wänke, and Plessner (2006) found that when people had 
confliciting implicit and explicit attitudes towards a product, their choices 
correlated with their implicit attitudes when under time pressure, but accorded 
more with their explicit attitudes when given time to deliberate. 
When the situations in which a person’s implicit attitudes have an independent 
influence on a recipient of social influence have been more substantially explored, 
it would be necessary to explore the mechanisms underlying the influence.  In the 
first study, when we observed an influence of implicit attitudes it was contrastive 
rather than assimilative.  It is possible this is because the implicit attitudes of the 
source were misperceived as certainty, rather than an attitude that was 
independent of the attitude they were expressing in the speech. Additionally, 
some extra variable that may be correlated with implicit attitudes, such as the 
likeability of the speaker, could be causing the effect, but this was not possible to 
disambiguate because Study 1 was a correlational study.  Perhaps if the recipients 
were made aware that the sources might not believe the words they were 
speaking, emphasizing that the sources were required to read the speech as part of 
the experiment, the recipients may attend more to the nonverbal behaviors of the 
source and thereby be more influenced by them.   
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Another means to emphasize the “hidden” attitude of the source would be to 
have recipients observe the source giving the pro- or counter-attitudinal message 
without sound, to focus the recipients on the nonverbal behaviors (c.f., Dovidio et 
al., 1997).  It would be very interesting if the implicit attitudes had a contrastive 
influence when the message could be heard, but an assimilative effect when only 
the nonverbal information was available. 
Another line of research suggested by the work presented here is to refine the 
methods used to induce opposing implicit and explicit attitudes.  In the second 
study, the procedure borrowed from Rydell and colleagues (2006) produced 
surprising results.  It appears as though the repetitive categorization of positive or 
negative behaviors as characteristic of a target was sufficient to create explicit 
attitudes that were congruent with the behaviors and implicit attitudes that were 
incongruent with the behaviors.  In the second study, no effect of the primes was 
found.  In the third study, the effect of the behaviors was attenuated, and the 
primes now influenced the sources’ attitudes.  On the explicit measure, the effect 
was straightforward – negative behaviors led to negative explicit attitudes, and 
(particularly with the positive behaviors) negative primes led to more negative 
explicit attitudes.  On the implicit measure, the effect was much more difficult to 
interpret, and merits further exploration.   
A natural extension would be to replicate the procedure from Study 2 and 3 
with a neutral or no prime condition, and with neutral behaviors, changing it to a 
3 (positive, neutral, negative primes) x 3 (negative, neutral, positive behaviors) 
design, to see if the effect of the behaviors on the implicit measure replicates.  If 
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the behaviors continued to have an opposite effect on the participants’ implicit 
attitudes, it would require a theoretical explanation that at present seems to be 
lacking.   Previous research on evaluative conditioning (Olson & Fazio, 2001; 
Staats & Staats, 1958) has shown a change in a person’s attitudes congruent with 
the unconditioned stimulus.  It is surprising, therefore, to observe an influence 
that is opposite the valence of the learned information on an implicit measure of 
attitudes.  This is especially so, as some research has shown conditioning effects 
only when the participant is aware of the contingency between the unconditioned 
stimulus (in this case, the behaviors) and the conditioned stimulus (the target) 
(Allen & Janiszewski, 1989; Insko & Oakes, 1966). 
Additionally, most work on impression formation shows the intuitive result 
that the valence of the traits or behaviors attributed to a person matches the 
valence of the impression of the person (Anderson, 1989; Asch, 1946; E. R. Smith 
& Zaraté, 1992).  However, to the author’s knowledge, there has been no test of a 
person’s implicit attitudes subsequent to the serial presentation of behaviors in an 
impression formation task. 
Nevertheless, these effects resemble the findings of Skowronski, Carlston, and 
Isham (1993), in which they covertly presented half of the participants with a trait 
label, and overtly presented half of the participants with the same negative trait 
label (“retarded”).  They found that those participants who were only overtly 
presented with the label recalled slightly more trait-incongruent behaviors than 
trait-congruent behaviors, and rated the target more positively, indicating a sort of 
contrast effect with the explicit presentation.  Those participants who only saw the 
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covert presentation of the trait label, however, rated the target more negatively 
and remembered more stereotype-congruent behaviors.  Interestingly, however, 
those who saw both the covert trait label and the overt trait label rated the 
participant highest and recalled the most stereotype-incongruent behaviors. 
This study used explicit measures and focused on impression formation rather 
than attitudes towards the target, but their work is at least parallel evidence for 
differing effects of explicit and implicit presentations on impression formation, 
and shows contrastive effects with explicit presentation.  Skowronski and 
colleagues (1993) attribute the contrast effects to explicit comparisons between 
the trait label and the behaviors, which were not always congruent and therefore 
led to contrasted impressions.  However, it is possible that the sources in our 
experiment may have explicitly accepted the behaviors as attributed to the target, 
but implicitly doubted it, leading to implicit ambivalence (Petty et al., 2006). 
Additionally, the effects of the behaviors on the source’s implicit attitudes 
could be akin to the “reverse priming” effect reported by (Glaser & Banaji, 1999).  
They noted that while moderate primes (e.g., pillow) led to the standard finding of 
facilitation of targets with the same valence, extreme primes (e.g., triumph) led to 
facilitation of oppositely valenced targets.  Thus, on an implicit attitude measure, 
moderate primes were automatically associated with the same valenced targets, 
but extreme primes were automatically associated with oppositely valenced 
targets.  In fact, the primes from the Rydell, et al (2006) study used in Study 2 and 
Study 3 seem more like the extreme primes than the moderate primes in Glaser 
and Banaji’s study.  Although only one word was used in both studies (“friend”, 
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which Glaser and Banaji rated as extreme), and without rating the primes from the 
Rydell study it is impossible to know for sure, the effect on the sources’ implicit 
attitudes suggest a similar contrast process may have been in action.   In other 
words, because the target was paired with extreme primes, the target may have 
become associated with the opposite valence of the primes, and therefore the 
target facilitated the oppositely valenced pairings in the IAT.  This remains a topic 
for future research. 
Overall, the studies reported here provide suggestive evidence that the 
methods used to simultaneously create implicit and explicit attitudes in a person 
can be refined and improved.  Additionally, based on previous work and the work 
reported here, it seems prudent to thoroughly test the behavioral consequences of 
attitudes formed through these techniques.  Finally, and most importantly, these 
studies provided evidence that a source’s implicit attitude can influence another 
person’s attitudes, although the circumstances in which this happens are still 
unclear, and deserve further research attention.  The contrastive effect of the 
sources’ implicit attitudes on the recipients’ explicit attitudes in Study 1 also 
warrants further research, as it has implications for research on social influence 
more generally. 
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Appendix A 
 
Explicit attitude measure from Study 1 
Please rate your agreement with these statements on the following scale: 
1 – strongly disagree; 2 – disagree; 3 – slightly disagree 
4 – neither agree nor disagree (or both agree and disagree) 
5 – slightly agree; 6 – agree; 7 – strongly agree  
 
1. I (dis)approve of the way President Bush is handling his job as president. 
2. I have an (un)favorable opinion of President Bush. 
3. President Bush is (dis)honest and (un)trustworthy. 
4. President Bush is a (weak) strong and (in)decisive leader. 
5. President Bush can(not) manage government effectively. 
6. George W. Bush's presidency has been a (failure) success. 
7. President Bush's remaining years in office will be a (failure) success. 
8. President Bush (does not have) has the personality and leadership qualities a 
president should have. 
9. I (dis)agree with President Bush on the issues that matter to me. 
10. President Bush is (in)capable of handling a crisis. 
11. President Bush (does not care) cares about the needs of people like me. 
12. President Bush (does not share) shares my values. 
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Appendix B 
 
Speeches read by sources in Study 1 
 
Pro-Bush speech: 
George W. Bush’s presidency has been a success domestically and 
internationally.  His reaction to 9/11 was swift and decisive, and our country is 
safer now than it was before he took office. 
President Bush cares about our nation’s relationship with other countries.  
Under his leadership, the Iraqi military is gaining new capabilities and new 
confidence, and the Iraqi people have made strides toward becoming a 
democracy. 
The President also cares about the citizens of his own country.  His “No Child 
Left Behind” Act has instituted higher standards for education, and national test 
scores are on the rise.  The Administration has also provided more Pell Grants for 
higher education so that more students can afford to attend college. 
President Bush’s economic plan has stimulated the economy to steadily gain 
jobs in every month since May 2003. His tax cuts have put more money in the 
hands of working people. Nationally, productivity is growing at the fastest rate in 
nearly 40 years, and new housing construction continues at a record pace. 
In conclusion, President Bush is a strong, decisive, and thoughtful leader who 
has strengthened our safety, increased our prosperity, and garnered respect at 
home and abroad. 
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Anti-Bush speech: 
George W. Bush’s presidency has been a failure domestically and 
internationally.  His policies since 9/11 turned tremendous world sympathy 
toward the U.S. into tremendous international resentment for the Administration’s 
policies, and he has yet to fulfill his pledge to capture Osama bin Laden ‘dead or 
alive.’ 
President Bush does not care about our nation’s relationship with other 
countries. In a search for weapons of mass destruction that were never found, he 
attacked a sovereign nation against the will of the United Nations and world 
community. 
The President also does not care about the citizens of his own country.  His 
“No Child Left Behind” Act has encouraged teachers to teach to the test and 
decreased the quality of education in the U.S.  The Administration even cut 
healthcare benefits for war veterans. 
President Bush’s economic plan caused over 2 million Americans to lose their 
jobs in his first two years in office.  He cut the government’s income through his 
tax cuts while simultaneously setting the record for the biggest annual budget 
spending increases and bankrupting all 50 state governments. 
In conclusion, President Bush is a thoughtless, nationalistic leader who has 
endangered Americans, decreased their prosperity, and lost respect at home and 
abroad. 
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Appendix C 
Explicit attitude measure from Study 2 
 
kind           cruel 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9 
 
bad           good 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9 
 
mean          pleasant 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9 
 
uncaring         caring 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9 
 
likeable                 unlikable 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9 
 
agreeable                  disagreeable 
1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9 
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Appendix D 
 
Behaviors used to form impression of target in Study 3 
 
Positive Behaviors 
always says good moring with a big grin on his face 
avoided other people in order not to give his cold to them 
bought a friend a potted plant on Valentine’s Day 
bought a neighborhood child a balloon at the fair 
bought an old guitar and fixed it up for his cousin 
built a bookcase for his new apartment 
built a stained glass lamp shade for his sister’s wedding present 
bought all of his friends a drink at the bar 
cooked a nice dinner for his friends 
donated a pint of blood to the Red Cross 
gave $20 to the United Way Campaign 
gave his seat on the bus to an older person 
gave directions to a driver who was lost 
had a surprise party for his father's birthday 
helped a foreign student locate a place to live 
helped a friend learn how to swim 
helped a friend move into an apartment 
helped a friend repaint his apartment 
helped a friend review for a test 
helped a lost child find his way home 
helped a neighbor child draw a picture 
helped a wheelchair patient up a ramp 
helped a young child learn the alphabet 
gave food to a homeless person 
helped in an activity program for handicapped children 
helped some neighboring campers set up their tent 
lent a friend his new sleeping bag and tent to go camping 
lent money to a friend in financial difficulty 
let an older person get in front of him in a grocery checkout line 
offered to share an umbrella with a stranger during a downpour 
pulled off the highway to assist a driver whose car had stalled 
rode his bike to work every day to cut down on pollution and gas consumption 
rushed to the aid of someone who fell off their bicycle 
saves cans and bottles for recycling 
sent flowers to his mother on Mother’s Day 
shut a neighbor’s door when they accidentally left it open 
spent his day off helping his mother around the house 
taught a neighbor child how to ride a bike 
tells those close to him that he loves them 
told a woman that she had dropped her wallet 
told the proprietor of a small store that she had given him too much change 
took care of the neighbor’s pets while they were gone 
tries to give someone a ride whenever he is driving a long distance 
turns in his assignments on time 
typed a manuscript for a friend 
volunteers one day a week to work for the child care center 
went to the hospital to visit his friend 
works 40 hours a week in an effort to pay for school 
writes his parents at least once every two weeks 
wrote letters to his congressperson supporting equal rights for all 
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Appendix D, cont. 
 
Negative Behaviors 
always asks his friends distracting and irrelevant questions 
borrowed some CDs from an acquaintance and never returned them 
broke a lamp at a party and later denied responsibility 
broke his friends guitar because he was angry 
butted into the front of a long line at a movie theater 
called in sick for work when he was well 
cheated during a poker game 
cheated on a take-home exam from the university 
closed his door in the face of someone collecting donations 
cheated on his girlfriend 
defaced a large rock with spray paint in a public park 
demanded immediate service from the salesman 
dented another car in a parking lot and refused to leave his name 
derided his girlfriend at a party 
did not show up for a prearranged tennis game 
did not thank a friend for a generous birthday gift 
drove his car down a residential street at 70 mph 
found a good watch in a park and pawned it 
got drunk and insulted everybody at a cocktail party 
had his driver’s license suspended for drunken driving 
had someone else take a math final for him 
had someone else write a term paper for him 
intentionally spread gossip about an acquaintance 
left a burner on when leaving his home 
left no tip for the waiter 
made fun of lesbians on the street 
parked his car in a space that was marked for a disabled person 
played his record player loudly late at night 
puts down anyone in a conversation who disagrees with him 
ran into a parked car while driving under the influence of alcohol 
refused to go out to dinner with 2 friends when they chose a restaurant not to his liking 
refused to lend a friend a book he needed for a paper 
refused to sign a petition to improve playground facilities for school children 
set off a fire alarm as a practical joke 
shouted and honked at another driver on the street 
interrupted a class to answer his phone 
stole a book from the college book store 
stole a parking place by driving into it from behind while someone else was backing into it 
stole merchandise from his work 
talked loudly on his cell phone in a restaurant 
threw a chair through a window at a party 
told a lie about his friend 
told the host and hostess of a party that their taste in furniture was horrible 
turned in someone else’s class project under his own name 
walked out of a restaurant without paying the bill 
was apprehended when trying to steal candy from corner grocery store 
was fined $500 for littering at a National Park 
witnessed a car accident, but didn’t report it 
yelled at a waitress for being too slow 
yelled at his grandma when she wouldn't lend him money 
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Appendix E 
Explicit attitude measure from Study 3 
 
Please rate your agreement with these statements on the following scale: 
1 – strongly disagree; 2 – disagree; 3 – slightly disagree 
4 – neither agree nor disagree (or both agree and disagree) 
5 – slightly agree; 6 – agree; 7 – strongly agree  
 
1. The discussion with the participant went very smoothly.  ______ 
2. I liked the participant.       ______ 
3. The participant liked me.      ______ 
4. The participant was very friendly.      ______ 
5. I felt comfortable with the participant.     ______ 
6. I felt the participant was comfortable with me.    ______ 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Pictorial representation of the affective misattribution procedure (AMP; 
Payne, et. al, 2005) used in Study 1 
 
Figure 2. Scatterplot of the a) sources’ and b) recipients’ explicit (abscissa) and 
implicit (ordinate) attitudes, Study 1.  
 
Figure 3. Change in recipients’ explicit attitudes as a function of the direction of 
the source’s speech, Study 1.  Error bars show ±1 standard error. 
 
Figure 4. Change in recipients’ implicit attitudes as a function of the sources’ 
implicit attitudes, Study 1.  Only sources with non-neutral attitudes are shown.  
Speech direction is illustrated by the shading of the crosses, and regression lines 
are fit to the total and the subgroups. 
 
Figure 5. Sources’ a) explicit and b) implicit attitudes as a function of the 
behaviors and primes in the impression formation task, Study 2. Error bars show 
±1 standard error. 
 
Figure 6. Scatterplot of the a) sources’ and b) recipients’ explicit (abscissa) and 
implicit (ordinate) attitudes, Study 2.  The shape denotes the behaviors learned by 
the source and the shading denotes the primes seen by the source. 
 
Figure 7. Recipients’ explicit attitude as a function of the sources’ implicit 
attitudes and (median split) explicit attitudes, Study 2. 
 
Figure 8. Recipients’ implicit attitudes as a function of the source’s (median-split) 
explicit attitudes, Study 2. Error bars show ±1 standard error. 
 
Figure 9. A still from a video watched by recipients in Phase II of Study 3. The 
target (a confederate) has been covered with a picture of himself, so only the 
source’s behavior can be seen. 
 
Figure 10. Sources’ a) explicit and b) implicit attitudes as a function of the 
behaviors and primes in the impression formation task, Study 3. Error bars show 
±1 standard error. 
 
Figure 11. Effect of primes on sources’ implicit attitudes in Study 2 and Study 3. 
 
Figure 12. Scatterplot of the a) sources’ and b) recipients’ explicit (abscissa) and 
implicit (ordinate) attitudes, Study 3. The shape denotes the behaviors learned by 
the source and the shading denotes the primes seen by the source. 
 
Figure 13. Recipients’ implicit attitudes as a function of the sources’ (median 
split) explicit attitudes. Error bars show ±1 standard error. 
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